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THE LANDSCAPE ART OF DANIEL URBAN KILEY
JOHN NIVALA*
Man is an animal who consciously creates landscape:
the only species which deliberately alters the design
of its environment for no other reason than to give
itself aesthetic pleasure.'
INTRODUCTION
Daniel Urban Kiley, an internationally renowned American
artist, died on February 21, 2004.2 In its obituary, the New York
Times described his work as "seminal," combining "modernist
functionalism with classical design principles."3 Described by his
peers as an elegant, inspirational, innovative, and distinguished
artist, Mr. Kiley was "revered in his field."4 His death was noted
"with sorrow" by the American Academy of Arts and Letters which
said his "passing will be deeply mourned."5
* Professor, Widener University School of Law.
1NAN FAIRBROTHER, THE NATURE OF LANDSCAPE DESIGN: AS AN ART FORM, A
CRAFT, A SOCIAL NECESSITY 3 (1974).
2See Douglas Martin, Obituary, Dan Kiley, Influential Landscape Architect, Dies
at 91, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at C13. The Boston Globe said that Kiley was
"considered one of the world's foremost landscape architects .... " Obituary,
Daniel Kiley; Regarded as Leading Landscape Architect, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23,
2004, at A13. The Chicago Tribune said that Kiley was "one of the nation's
greatest landscape architects" with an "international body of work." Blair
Kamin, Obituary, Dan Kiley, 91; Transformed Landscape Architecture, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 26, 2004, at Cll.
3 Martin, supra note 2, at C13.
4 Adam Bernstein, Landscape Architect Daniel Urban Kiley Dies, WASH. POST,
Feb. 25, 2004, at B6. See also Editorial, Preserving Our More Recent Past, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 2003, at B8 (describing Kiley as "the dean of American landscape
architects"); Adrian Higgins, Hollin Hills: A New Look at a Fifties Landscape,
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1997, at 12 (describing Kiley as "one of the great landscape
architects of our time").
5 Obituary, Kiley - Daniel Urban, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at B10.
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Daniel Kiley's work also received plaudits during his lifetime.
The U.S. Army awarded him the Legion of Merit, a top military
honor, for his work.6 Harvard University, which Kiley attended
without graduating, established a lectureship in his honor, gave
him an outstanding lifetime achievement award, and established
an exhibition fund in his name.7 The American Academy in Rome
named him as artist in residence and later held a celebration to
honor his work.' The National Endowment for the Arts gave him
a distinguished fellowship and later awarded him the National
Medal of Honor in the Arts, the highest honor given to an Ameri-
can artist.9 The Smithsonian's Cooper-Hewitt National Design
Museum gave him a National Design Award for lifetime achieve-
ment.1" This is merely a skimming review of the awards and
honors Kiley received."
So why does his name not ring many bells? Because he was a
landscape designer. 2 His work "sought ways to express human
order on the land, but with a touch that would reveal nature, not
decorate with it." 3 He was a master of the landscape, "the Mies
van der Rohe and Le Corbusier of landscape architecture" who
"conceived some of the greatest urban green spaces of our time."4
Kiley's art was a complement to the architecture. "Light, space,
flora: these were the basic elements of the modern building's
6 See BOSTON GLOBE Obituary, supra note 2.
7 See Martin, supra note 2; DAN KILEY & JANE AMIDON, DAN KILEY: THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF AMERICA'S MASTER LANDSCAPE ARCHITECT 203 (1999).
8 KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 203.
9 Id. See also Dinitia Smith, Clinton Awards Medals in Arts and Humanities,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at E27.
" See Linda Hales, An Award That Was Made in the Shade; Museum Honors
Daniel Kiley for His Landscapes, WASH. POST, July 11, 2002, at C2 (describing
Kiley as "America's preeminent landscape architect").
11 For a more complete list, see KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 203.
12 See Herbert Muschamp, If Not Utopia, What Is It? The World by Kiley, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at C29 [hereinafter Muschamp, If Not Utopia].
13 BOSTON GLOBE Obituary, supra note 2. Kiley was said to have created
"'landscapes in the hearts of titanic industrial cities that are at once rational
and deeply poetic.'" Id. (internal citation omitted).
4 Matt Tyrnauer, Modern's Masters, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2004, at 106.
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context," and Kiley was "the man who fashioned those elements
into art." 5
Kiley's best work was deceptively simple; it made "spaces
unfold like a walk in nature."'6 And, like a walk in nature, the
observer may contemplate the Creator, not a creator. 7 Kiley's
designs revealed a spiritual sense of the land and moved the
observer through space, creating a sense of the infinite.18 Nature
was latent art; his art was nature revealed.
Yet, unlike other artists, his work has not consistently been
accorded the respect due a master. For example, Kiley was a
landscape designer for Lincoln Center in New York City, one of
America's most visible and frequented public spaces. He created a
"glade of tall elegant sycamores," four trees to a twenty-square-foot
planter, which "sculptured the air in a spatial pattern that echoed
the strong horizontal and vertical planes of the surrounding
15See Muschamp, If Not Utopia, supra note 12. See also Calvin Tomkins, The
Garden Artist, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 1995, at 139.
Even a partial listing of Kiley's more important commissions
makes you wonder why his name is not better known outside his
profession. People who are familiar with the work of twenty or
more living architects may have never heard of Kiley, whose
landscape designs have provided the settings for so many buil-
dings by those very architects.
Id.
16 Hales, supra note 10, at C2.
"
7 See Martin, supra note 2, at C13. "He once wrote that the greatest contribution
a designer could make was to 'link the human and the natural in such a way as
to recall our fundamental place in the scheme of things."' Id. See also JOHN
BRINCKERHOFF JACKSON, LANDSCAPE IN SIGHT: LOOKING AT AMERICA x (Helen
Lefkowitz Horowitz ed., 1997) (introducing the writings of John Brinckerhoff
Jackson).
He establishes that the way we build our cities and countryside
reveals our society and culture. Implicitly, he states what he
later explicitly proclaimed: "Landscape is history made visible."
He demonstrates how landscape makes manifest our strivings,
how the basic human motive for creating landscape, especially
the domestic landscape, is "the recreation of heaven on earth."
Id. (citations omitted).
8 See Anne Raver, Moving Heaven With Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2000, at F1
[hereinafter Raver, Moving Heaven].
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architecture."' 9 Kiley gave strict instructions for maintaining this
work. But when the trees became diseased and needed replace-
ment, no one at Lincoln Center consulted Kiley or even looked for
his instructions. His sycamores were removed and "replaced by big
fat stranded-looking pear trees," a devastating change that Kiley
said made the design look "kind of silly."2"
However, such a result may be a perverse tribute to Kiley's
art. As one critic noted, "that's what happens when a landscape is
invisible."2' Kiley said he was "always searching for the purest
connection that holds us all together. Some form of sacred geome-
try. Sometimes the prevailing order is unseen, unknown."22
And, in the case of Lincoln Center, unappreciated.
In his landmark article, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet,
John Henry Merryman, in discussing an artist's rights under the
French droit moral, said that a component of that law was
the right of integrity (of the work of art), also some-
times called the right to respect of the work. The
notion is that the work of art is an expression of the
artist's personality. Distortion, dismemberment or
misrepresentation of the work mistreats an expres-
sion of the artist's personality, affects his artistic
identity, personality, and honor, and thus impairs a
legally protected personality interest.23
'
9Anne Raver, Cherishing Landscapes as LivingArt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1995,
at C1 [hereinafter Raver, Cherishing Landscapes].20 Id. Kiley said that he "was trying to get a sense of the relationship of this
architectural grove of trees with the building itself .... And to give a wonderful
kind of shady retreat. With one little tree in there, it just looks kind of silly." Id.
at C6. The assault on Kiley's work continues. See Robin Pogrebin, Preser-
vationists Criticize Plans to Change Some of Lincoln Center's Open Spaces, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2005, at B9.
22 Raver, Moving Heaven, supra note 19.
23 John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1023, 1027 (1976). See Symposium, Reports From the Front Lines of the Art and
Cultural Property Wars, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1 (2001) (noting that
"this conference honored John Henry Merryman, whose writings over several
decades have defined with incisive clarity and prescience these seminal topics").
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Bernard Buffet had decorated a refrigerator that was auctioned at
a charity benefit. He considered the refrigerator, which had six
panels, to be one work. When the owner subsequently sought to
sell one of the panels, Buffet sued under French law to prevent the
sale. He won.
As Merryman noted, treating "one of the six panels.., as a
separate work distorted and misrepresented the artist's inten-
tion."24 In addition, there was an interest involved that relates
directly to what Lincoln Center management did to Kiley's syca-
more grove:
On the level of individual interest there is more at
stake than the concern of the artist and his heirs for
the integrity of his work. There is also the interest of
others in seeing, or preserving the opportunity to see,
the work as the artist intended it, undistorted and
"unimproved" by the unilateral actions of others,
even those with the best intentions and the most
impressive credentials. We yearn for the authentic,
for contact with the work in its true version, and we
resent and distrust anything that misrepresents it.
25
As the designer, however, Kiley had no way to protect his work
during his lifetime under both past and present federal law. This
See also Philip Vineyard, "No One Expects the Spanish Inquisition"--Twice:
Subduing the Moral Rights Monster, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 223, 227
(2004) ("Starting with Professor John Henry Merryman's Hastings Law Journal
article,. . . the moral rights movement seemed to be gaining the momentum
necessary for widespread acceptance.") (citations omitted).24 Merryman, supra note 23, at 1027.
251Id. at 1041 (citation omitted). Merryman continued as follows:
Art is an aspect of our present culture and our history; it helps
tell us who we are and where we came from. To revise, censor,
or improve the work of art is to falsify a piece of the culture. We
are interested in protecting the work of art for public reasons,
and the moral right of the artist is in part a method of providing
for private enforcement of this public interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
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is an unworthy gap in the law, which otherwise recognizes the
value of art.26
As Kiley demonstrated through his work, landscape design is
both a visual art and a visual resource.27 It is beyond prosaic; it
is aesthetic, and, as such, maintaining its integrity promotes the
general welfare.28 It is more than cultivated; it is cultural and, as
such, its protection is in the public interest. 29 Yet, because it does
not easily fit the definition of architecture, sculpture, or art, it falls
into a legal crack after completion.3 °
26 See id. at 1048; Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the
Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights, 26 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 297 (2003).27 See Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 697, 697-98 (1995):
Protection of visual resources has been an acknowledged goal of
environmental management for at least a generation .... [It]
operate [s] on the assumption that such visual resources provide
an opportunity for "aesthetic experiences," which are highly
valued by the public. Yet the visual landscape rightly has been
called our "most maligned, ignored, [and] unappreciated natural
resource."
Id. (citations omitted).28 See id. at 718.
[Alesthetic goals have been accepted in a majority of juris-
dictions as a legitimate exercise of the police power.... Without
much fanfare, courts in these states have found that ordinances
that seek "to protect the unique aesthetics" of an area or
promote "the preservation or enhancement of the visual
environment" promote objectives sufficiently related to the
general welfare to fit within that prong of the police power.
Id.
2 9See Eve Darian-Smith, Legal Imagery in the "Garden of England," 2 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 395, 407 (1995) ("[Ihe garden is a strong cultural
metaphor for law and order, perpetuity, security, and intrinsically ethnic purity.
It is a symbol of cultivation and, by association, deems its protectors cultivated.")
(citation omitted).
The question is where are the protectors? See Anne Raver, When It Goes It's
Gone: Manhattan's Vanishing Oases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at F1 ("[M]any
of New York City's modern landscapes are vanishing .... [olr being so radically
altered that the power of their bold designs, as abstract and minimalist as a
Mondrian painting, as curving as a Noguchi sculpture, have been lost.").
30See Peter H. Karlen, What's Wrong With VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral
Rights, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 905, 907-08 (1993) ("[W]here is the
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Does this work warrant protection? Kiley's landscapes were
the result of a creative and disciplined design process. Yet, perhaps
with the exception of Frederick Law Olmsted's work, landscape
design is not regarded as art.31 Landscape art is not just nature, it
is nature designed; it is the designer's personality, philosophy, and
aesthetic craft.32 The vocabulary may be flora, not words, but the
skillfully designed work can be poetic and culturally significant.3 3
borderline between a sculpture . . . and an environmental, landscape, or
architectural work[?] .... Because the [law] does not provide a broad definition
of "fine art". . . many works will fall into the cracks, and there will be much
litigation about basic definitions."). See also Bobrowski, supra note 27, at 724.
[Tihere is ample support for the proposition that enhancement
of the visual resource constitutes a valid public purpose. The
historical, philosophical, and psychological literature of land-
scape aesthetics describes a link between the scenic visual
resource and aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience has
intrinsic value; it is also a component of leisure, recreation, and
stress-reduction.
Id.
31 See Jane Holtz Kay, Earth In The Balance, THE NATION, Feb. 14, 2000, at 28
("Anonymous is a landscape architect. Not for these placemakers the recognition
given to their peers in building .... But those who fashion rolling greenswards,
transform wasted landscapes into common ground or turn sordid waterfronts
into shared edges are unsung, if not unknown."). See also Fay Sweet, Down To
Earth, DESIGN WEEK, Oct. 29, 1999, at 26 ("[Tlhe skills to mould and shape
outdoor space are becoming highly prized. As a creative discipline [landscape
architecture] is part of the mix of many three-dimensional projects, and is
looking to improve its standing among other practitioners, particularly
architects.").
32 See Galina Krasilovsky, A Sculpture is Worth A Thousand Words: The First
Amendment Rights of Homeowners Publicly Displaying Art on Private Property,
20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 521, 539 (1996).33 Marilyn Bethany, Seeing the Forest for the Trees, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 28,
1982, at 58 ("The key to understanding landscape design: think very big. 'A
collection of choice plants is not a landscape any more than a list of choice words
is a poem ... . 'The merit is in the design, not the materials it is expressed in.").
Landscape design can be an "integrating force for nature and culture." Robert
Z. Melnick, Considering Nature and Culture in Historic Landscape Preservation,
in PRESERVING CULTURAL LANDSCAPES IN AMERICA 22, 43 (Arnold R. Alanen &
Robert Z. Melnick eds., 2000).
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The work reveals what is otherwise repressed, unveiling what is
vital, beautiful, and complex.34 It can legitimately be considered
art.35
This legitimacy, however, is hard to come by for landscape art.
Its makeup is fragmented, its settings are often secondary, its true
meaning is often ephemeral. 36 That does not necessarily put it
outside the scope of art. There is a creator, a designer at work
whose dignity and spirit are reflected in the work which, perhaps
more than other works, is offered up to public inspection, evalua-
tion, and use.37
34 See AARON BETSKY, LANDSCRAPERS: BUILDING WITH THE LAND 23 (2002);
Robin Karson, Preface, in PIONEERS OF AMERICAN LANDSCAPE DESIGN xi
(Charles A. Birnbaum et al. eds., 2000). See also ANNE WHISTON SPIRN, THE
LANGUAGE OF LANDSCAPE 49 (1998) ("[LI andscape authors tell similar stories by
shaping landscape directly: siting the paths along which others experience
landscape, choosing what people will see (and what they will not see), and in
what order, framing the view .... Landscape literature is the product of life not
a mere representation of it.") [hereinafter SPIRN, LANGUAGE OF LANDSCAPE).35 See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 366.
A formal garden . . . is by way of being a work of art in the
strictest meaning of the term. It is conceived and executed by an
artist in accordance with the traditional canons of his art, and
its purpose is to give esthetic pleasure. The fact that he may be
called. . . a landscape architect and that the garden... is also
used as a place for sociability and games does not really change
the essential nature of the formal garden as a work of art ....
Id. See also Christopher Hall, Avant-Green: Landscaping As a Fine Art, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at AR25.36 See PETER WALKER & MELANIE SIMO, INVISIBLE GARDENS: THE SEARCH FOR
MODERNISM IN THE AMERICAN LANDSCAPE 3 (1994) ("Landscape architecture
... is made up of too many preexisting fields and disciplines to have a clear
focus. Landscape architects typically create settings for more prominent objects
.... Works of landscape architecture tend to be ephemeral, and their moments
of perfection (between long periods of growth and decay) are fleeting.").37 See Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor
Before Free Speech?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 211-12 (1994)
("Artists express themselves through their work. While providing beauty and
wonder to those who enjoy their works, they give a part of themselves to their
audience .... Artists' reputations and honor are also at stake whenever they
submit their work for public inspection.").
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We treat creators differently if we regard their creations as
art.3" We acknowledge that altering or improperly displaying an
artist's work can cause a variety of personal and public harms.3 9 By
that acknowledgment, we express our appreciation and continued
encouragement of the creative effort.
This treatment is a social judgment regarding the value of
public art.4" If we understand public art "to include visual works
of any medium... which are displayed in a location accessible to
the public," then Kiley's work-such as his Lincoln Center design
-is public art.4 ' His work was designed for that particular site,
" See Thierry Joffrain, Deriving a (Moral) Right for Creators, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J.
735, 737 (2001) ("Creative individuals may deserve a particular status in society
simply for making lives less drab. Besides the value of color to human life,
creativity also may be an irreplaceable cornerstone in many endeavors. Inde-
pendent of any value, perhaps humankind has an inherent affinity for
creativity.") (citations omitted); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors'
and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 95, 103 (1997) (stating that we regard as art "those works... which
are typically unique and highly individual works that require substantial skill
and effort").
39Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 38, at 102.
Physical alteration of an artist's work.., or prejudicial display
of the work, can harm the artist in a variety of ways. The most
direct is simply the subjective personal anguish the artist feels
from seeing his work abused, quite apart from-and even in
spite of-what anyone else might think about it.
Id. See also Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists' Moral Rights: A Primer,
7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 50-51 (1998).
The right of integrity protects the artist . . . . Prohibiting
changes without permission shows respect for the art work, its
creator, and the process by which she created. This right avoids
value judgments as to the quality of the art and the seriousness
of the artist's undertaking. The society that recognizes this right
recognizes the value of all creative efforts and uses it to
encourage more.
Id.
40 See Patty Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists' Rights and Historic
Preservation, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431, 463 (1994).
41Vera Zlatarski, "Moral" Rights and Other Moral Interests: Public Art Law in
France, Russia, and the United States, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 201, n.1
(1999).
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designed to enhance the observer's total experience." It was an
ensemble.
Kiley said his designs began "with a clearly stated structure
... the expression of human order on the land."' He sought to
inspirit the design, "to bring a sense of mystery, loose rhythm and
infinite expansiveness to a design."" But there was an aspect to
his work that could not "really be designed at all; it consists of
the phenomena that occur as a landscape evolves throughout
seasons and time."45 His work, at its best, "is not 'seen'; ... not
understood as something that has been designed and deliberately
constructed."46 It looks as if it grew naturally in place.
Frederick Law Olmsted, best known for his work on New York
City's Central Park, was recently characterized as "an artist who
chose to work in a medium that then-even more than now-
lacked public recognition."47 Olmsted, who constantly had to repel
those seeking to alter his design for Central Park, said
42 See Francesca Garson, Note, Before That Artist Came Along, It Was Just a
Bridge: The Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork,
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 237 (2001) ("The specificity of site-oriented
works means that they are conceived for, dependent upon and inseparable from
their location.... Based on the inter-dependence of work and site, site-specific
works address the content and context of their site critically .... Site-specific
works primarily engender a dialogue with their surroundings.") (citation
omitted).
43 KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 109.
4Id.
4 5 Id.
4Anne Whiston Spirn, Seeing and Making the Landscape Whole, PROGRESSIVE
ARCHITECTURE, Aug. 1991, at 92 [hereinafter Spirn, Seeing and Making].
4 7 WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, A CLEARING IN THE DISTANCE: FREDRICK LAW OLMsTEAD
AND AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 23 (1999). As the author noted,
Olmsted was frustrated by people's unwillingness to recognize
landscape architecture as an art. Olmsted thought that this was
chiefly because they confused it with what he called decorative
gardening. According to him, landscape architecture involved
composition and perspective in which details were subordinate
to the whole, contrary to decorative gardening, which treated
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"[Tihe only solid ground of resistance to dangers of
this class will be found to rest in the conviction that
the Park throughout is a single work of art, and as
such, subject to the primary law of every work of art,
namely, that it shall be framed upon a single, noble
motive, to which the design of all its parts, in some
more or less subtle way, shall be confluent and help-
ful.
48
Olmsted considered his work to be art, integrated in its parts, its
integrity deserving of protection.49
Olmsted's consideration has passed down to the present. Kiley
saw his work as an amalgam, comprised of different elements to be
considered as a whole. He fashioned those elements into art.50 His
48 NORMAN T. NEWTON, DESIGN ON THE LAND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANDSCAPE
ARCHITECTURE 286 (1971) (citation omitted). See also RYBCZYNSKI, supra note
47, at 396.
He considered landscape architecture akin to landscape paint-
ing, except that the landscape architect used natural materials
instead of pigments. That, of course, was the root of the problem.
Since the medium-as well as the subject-was nature itself, the
public often failed to discriminate between the two. No one
would think of altering a landscape on canvas, but a garden was
different.
Id.4 9 Olmsted's contention still applies today. In an editorial regarding the winning
design for the September 11 memorial at the World Trade Center site, the New
York Times said that the "memorial design presented.., is a vision of how all
the elements that might come into play can be combined to greatest effect....
The real memorial is the single coherent work of art created by [the designers],
and it must be protected as such." Editorial, A Memorial Worth Preserving, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at A18.
50Kiley wrote that "[tihe best part of design is that there are no rules.... Design
is truly a process of discovery. It is an exciting dialogue that draws upon all of
one's knowledge, intuitions, values and inspirations. To be good, the designer
has to trust his or her instinct . . . ." KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 176.
Another pair of authors said that Kiley "often insisted that there is no real
difference between architecture and landscape design. His work is a fusion of the
two. It is also a kind of sculpture-not merely a setting." WALKER & SIMO, supra
note 36, at 173.
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is a dynamic, evolving art whose components "are moving and
growing in a related, organic way; that's what is exciting, this
sense of space and release and movement.""1 He was an artist
working with a living medium; the work's integrity could be
compromised by neglect or act, whether indifferent or deliberate. 2
What happened to Kiley's work at the Lincoln Center is an
example of curatorial neglect, which led to the replacement of his
plantings without consulting him. The result "just looks kind of
silly."53 More poignantly, Kiley wrote that "this action emasculated
the volumetric power of the original planting and severed the link
between the architecture of plantings and buildings that together
form a civic space of integrity."54 Landscape design is design that
needs time.5 It requires curatorial attention if the result is not to
be haphazard or distorted. Kiley's work was by design, and the
51KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 13. See also Deborah Weisgall, Fighting Over
the Future of an American Arden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at AR26 ("Designed
landscapes imply a tension between nature and art. Nature, messy and evolving,
behooves us to leave it be; art grants the illusion of stillness. Landscape, then,
is the most fragile of art forms; its permanence relies on constant change.").
52 Kiley put it this way:
It is the bane, or perhaps the beauty, of many designed
landscapes that significant and ongoing care is required not only
to preserve day-to-day appearances, but to ensure that the
design's structure evolves fully .... As architects of a living
medium, landscape designers have a mandate to guide their
work through its successive evolutionary stages-or relinquish
its integrity.
KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 96.
5 3Raver, Cherishing Landscapes, supra note 19, at C6.
54 KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 57.
5 5 See SPIRN, LANGUAGE OF LANDSCAPE, supra note 34, at 207. Kiley described it
as follows:
[Pllants and other materials are chosen with current as well as
future dimensions in mind, with awareness of summer as well
as winter habit and so on. Specific effects are crafted to be vocal
at various stages of development, and it is precisely these
dynamic changes that measure the spirit of a place.... The
intrigue of the design is being revealed over time in all the
permutations of its physicality.
KILEY& AMIDON, supra note 7, at 136.
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integrity of that design-and the designer-should have been
respected."
Part I of this Article discusses how legislatures and courts
have attempted to define landscape architecture and will suggest
that landscape design is a more accurate term when discussing
the work of a master like Daniel Kiley. Part II discusses how the
integrity of landscape designs is left unprotected by the basic
federal copyright law and its two specialized provisions: the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act and the Visual
Artists Rights Act. Part III discusses the possibility that the
integrity of landscape designs might be protected by state legisla-
tion despite the Copyright Act's preemption provision. Part IV
concludes that landscape design should be accepted as a visual art
and its integrity-including that of the artist-should be respected.
I. WHAT Is LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE?
Although Kiley frequently referred to his work as landscape
design, he was generally known as a master of landscape architec-
ture. But what is landscape architecture?57 In an early effort to
define it, one court said "[1] andscape architecture has been recog-
nized.., as a profession embracing a field of highly technical and
specialized knowledge and activities 'between the professions of
architecture and engineering."'5 8 The court upheld the following
statutory definition:
56 See WALKER & SIMO, supra note 36, at 173 ("Kiley's work.., is architecture,
in its rhythmic modulation of geometric point grids, its direct extension of
ground planes, and its often flawless extension of interior space to the larger,
continuous space out of doors.").
5 7See id. at 315 ("For more than a century, landscape architecture has been a
field difficult to define.... [L] andscape architecture still depends on rich, varied
combinations of skills, insights, and bodies of knowledge, continually recombined
and redefined by the individuals who practice landscape architecture."). See
generally G.B. TOBEY, A HISTORY OF LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE: THE RELATION-
SHIP OF PEOPLE TO ENVIRONMENT (1973).
" Paterson v. Univ. of the State of N.Y., 40 Misc. 2d 1023, 1030-3 1, 244 N.Y.S.2d
394, 403 (Nassau County, Spec. Term 1963) (internal citation omitted).
279
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 29:267
A person practices landscape architecture.., where,
and to the extent that the dominant purpose of such
services is the preservation, enhancement or determi-
nation of proper land uses, natural land features,
ground cover and planting, naturalistic and aesthetic
values, the settings and approaches to structures or
other improvements, natural drainage and the consi-
deration and determination of inherent problems of
the land relating to erosion, wear and tear, blight or
other hazards.5 9
This definition, or a close variation of it, has been adopted by many
states.6°
It is not, however, universal. In People ex rel. Department of
Registration & Education v. Hund,6' the Illinois Attorney General
filed a complaint against two individuals doing business as
"Classic Landscape Engineers."62 The complaint alleged that the
business name implied that the defendants were registered
engineers, which they were not. When the defendants' attorney
emphasized that the defendants were primarily landscapers
performing relatively simple tasks, the court responded that
"landscaping in its highest form is both an art, and a science,
involving a complex integration of social, ecological and physical
59 1d. at 399.60See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-36-102(a)(2) (Michie 2001 Replacement); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-30-1402(4) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-367(2) (2003); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 201(2)(a) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 481.303(6) (West 2004);
GA. CODE ANN. § 43-23-1(3) (2004); IDAHO CODE § 54-3002(2) (Michie 2004); IND.
CODE ANN. § 25-4-2-1(b) (Burns 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7003(g) (2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.2201(b) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-2-3(b)
(2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 327.600(1) (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 623A.060
(Michie 2004); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7321 (Consol. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89A-1(3)
(2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4703.30(B) (Anderson 2005); 63 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 902(4) (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-28-10(b) (Law. Co-op. 2003);
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.96.030 (2004); W. VA. CODE § 30-22-2(a)(5) (2004).




2005] THE LANDSCAPE ART OF DANIEL URBAN KILEY
considerations."63 As another court noted in the alternative, a
landscape architect arranges and modifies "the effects of natural
scenery over a tract of land so as to produce the best aesthetic
effect with regard to the use to which the tract is to be put."6
These views consider landscape architecture as more than
horticulture.65 It is seen as deliberate design, as "the art-or the
science, if preferred-of arranging land, together with the spaces
and objects upon it, for safe, efficient, healthful, pleasant human
use."66 The profession's patriarchs, Olmsted and Calvert Vaux,
used the name landscape architecture "to convey their intent to
bear toward the total landscape the same relation that an archi-
tect bears toward a building, with essential emphasis on design."67
Olmsted later came to believe that "what they had done in Central
Park... was much more than horticulture. It was art. It was,
however, a particular kind of art. At one point he referred to it as
'sylvan art.'"6 He did not then fancy the term landscape architec-
ture, writing to Vaux that "[i]f you are bound to establish this new
art.., you don't want an old name for it."'69
Several states have defined landscape architecture with simi-
lar emphasis on its aesthetic and public welfare aspects. Illinois
defines it as "the art and science of arranging land, together with
the spaces and objects upon it, for the purpose of creating a safe,
63Id. at 837.
6 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Dep't of Revenue, 96 Wash. App. 1052, 1999 WL
528028, at *4 (1999).65 See NEWTON, supra note 48, at xxiii.
[LIandscape architecture continues to be regarded by many...
as a horticultural field .... To be sure . . . the landscape
architect must know plant materials, not only biologically but
also as a visual factor in design .... It is obvious that spaces
are what humans do their living in; space must therefore be
comprehended as the major medium of design.
Id. See also JACKSON, supra note 17, at 305 ("A landscape is thus a space
deliberately created to speed up or slow down the process of nature .... [Ilt
represents man taking upon himself the role of time.").
66 NEWTON, supra note 48, at xxi. See also WALKER & SIMO, supra note 36, at xi.67 NEWTON, supra note 48, at xxi (citation omitted).
68 RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 47, at 261.
6 9 Id.
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efficient, healthful, and aesthetically pleasing physical environ-
ment for human use and enjoyment."70 In Kentucky, it is "the
planning of outdoor space involving the relationships of people,
flora and fauna, and facilities, with emphasis on the function,
preservation, conservation, restoration, and enhancement of the
physical environment... in accordance with the accepted profes-
sional standard of public health, welfare and safety."7 1 In Maine,
a landscape architect's "services must apply artistic and scientific
principles to the research, planning, design and management of
both natural and built environments."72 In Montana, landscape
architecture "is the design discipline specifically oriented to
addressing the problems involved in adapting man's uses of land
to the characteristics of the exterior environment both function-
ally and aesthetically."73 And, in Maryland, to practice landscape
architecture is to "provide any service or creative work in the
analysis or design of land and natural resources that requires
training and experience in the application of the biological,
physical, mathematical, and social sciences."74
These definitions recognize the artistic aspect of man-made
landscapes.75 Landscape design requires composition, a creation of
space upon the land to serve a human purpose. But can it be, as
70225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3(e) (West 1998). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-
24B-3(D) (West 2003) ("the art, profession or science of designing land improve-
ments"); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. 1051.001(6) (Vernon 2004) ("the art and science
of landscape analysis, landscape planning, and landscape design").
7 1 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 323A.010(3) (Michie 2001).
72 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 220(2)(A) (West 1999).
73MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-66-103(4) (2003). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:3A-2(b)
(West 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-400 (Michie 2001) (stating that, similar to
the New Jersey statute, landscape architecture is "any service ... relative to
projects principally directed at the functional and aesthetic use of land").
74 MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 9-101(j)(1) (2004).75 See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 304-05.
[Tihe formula landscape as a composition of man-made space on
the land ... says that a landscape is not a natural feature of the
environment but a synthetic space, a man-made system of spaces
superimposed on the face of the land, functioning and evolving
not according to natural laws but to serve a community....
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this Article will argue, defined as an art?76 Congress has done so
in specialized legislation.77 The states have not been consistent in
their definitions.
At its best (and Kiley's work was among the best ever), a
landscape design can be considered "as 'object'--as a work of art
that makes us think, or feel the wind, or sense the underground
stream beneath our feet."79 Kiley wrote that he had been searching
for "a language with which to vocalize the dynamic hand of human
order on the land-a way to reveal nature's power and create
spaces of structural integrity. . . ITihis is not about style of
76 See Anne Whiston Spirn, Reclaiming Territory: Four Books on Landscape,
PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE, Feb. 1993, at 103 ("[Llandscape design is a
difficult art. The ground plane is rarely flat; it rolls, twists, and tilts. Landscapes
lie open to the sky; scales and boundaries are fluid. Landscapes are living,
dynamic, ephemeral . . . ."). See also Weisgall, supra note 51 ("Restoring a
beloved landscape is as tricky as restoring the 'Mona Lisa.' 'It is difficult to
understand landscape as art'.... 'Places become beloved in their decrepitude;
people have a visceral reaction against change.' Landscape is art, but it is also
real estate ... ").7 7See 42 U.S.C. § 8143(1) (2000) ("For the purpose of this subchapter - (1) the
terms 'art' and 'arts' include.., landscape architecture... "); 16 U.S.C. § 470w-
5(f) (2000) ("For purposes of this section, the term 'building arts' includes...
landscape architecture, preservation and conservation... ").78 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-80.5-101(d)(IX) (2002) (stating that "'[w]orks
of art' means all forms of original creations of visual art including . . .
Environmental landscaping"). Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4b-53(a) (West
1998) (stating that "[w]ork of art as used in this section shall not include
landscape architecture or landscape gardening"), with D.C. CODE ANN. § 39-
202(6) (2001) (stating that "[the term 'public art' shall not include landscape
design . . . unless designed by a visual artist as part of an artwork design
authorized by the [Arts] Commission").
79Anne Raver, The New Crop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at HD42. Kiley said it
was "a pleasure to work with artists as clients.., for they have the capacity to
envision spatial relationships and recognize the importance of form, colour and
texture in the built environment." KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 150. See
also Darian-Smith, supra note 29, at 395 n.1.
The meaning of landscape is extremely complicated and involves
a long, intellectual genealogy. I treat landscape as a form of
"cultural practice," and. . . "think of landscape, not as an object
to be seen or a text to be read, but as a process by which social
and subjective identities are formed."
Id. (citation omitted).
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decoration but about articulation of space.""0 Or, as another author
wrote, a "conviction that landscape is language... seems natural
to many landscape architects, for landscape is a language derived
from the core activity of landscape architecture: artful shaping...
to fulfill function and express meaning."8
Perhaps the major conceptual problem is that, unlike most
other art forms, landscape art is dynamic rather than static.8 2 Its
primary medium is organic; it is always in process and is never
perfected. Jen Jensen, a renowned American landscape designer,
preferred to be called a maker of natural parks and
gardens rather than a landscape architect, and he
believed that his own brand of art making was a
superior brand. "All other arts are founded on dead
materials," he wrote. "In these materials there is no
growth... there is not the freedom, nor the mystery
of the infinite, to as great a degree as in land-
scaping."83
Landscape design is daily growth and change requiring constant
curatorial concern if the work is to be appreciated as envisaged.'
8 0 KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 13.
"I SPIRN, LANGUAGE OF LANDSCAPE, supra note 34, at 8. See also JACKSON, supra
note 17, at 301 ("[W~e always need a word or phrase to indicate a kind of
environment or setting which can give vividness to a thought or event or
relationship; a background placing it in the world.").
8 2 See Jane Holtz Kay, Making Dead Land Live Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1990, at C1. "Landscape architects are experienced with plants that demand
time to mature and know how to paint a canvas as dynamic and changing as
the earth itself." Id. at C12.83Jim Robbins, Native Grounds, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 16, 2004, at 68, 70-71.
' Bethany, supra note 33, at 58 ("The green world . . .is an ever-changing
composition of multidimensional materials. Not only must a design be effective
the day it is installed, it must still work in 5, 10 or 25 years. Moreover, the
design must do more than look pretty, it must make sense of the land."). But see
Ken Druse, Where Victorians Met Their Match, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,2004, at F1.
But I sometimes wonder if a garden should be preserved after
its maker has departed, or just allowed to melt back into the
earth. Gardens should not be frozen like a decorative room in a
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The basic federal copyright law did not protect the integrity of
Daniel Kiley's public works as a landscape designer. Copyright
protection is extended to "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works." 5 These include "works of artistic craftsmanship insofar
as their form but not their... utilitarian aspects are concerned,"
unless "such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article."86
A primary goal of copyright law is to encourage artistic
activity for the public's benefit, and the protection afforded the
creator is secondary to this purpose." Landscape art might be
museum, or like the eternally new plantings at Disney World.
After all, the garden would not be static if its maker were still
present: invention, discovery, growth and death would continue,
along with the introduction of new plants.
Id.
8" 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression... from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated .... Works of
authorship include... pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works...
8617 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
"
7See Raleigh W. Newsam, II,Architecture and Copyright-Separating the Poetic
From the Prosaic, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1073, 1101 (1997) ("Copyright law rewards
authors for their contributions to society, but the benefits are considered 'secon-
dary' to the advancement of the arts for society's benefit. Thus, 'the ultimate aim
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.'")
(citations omitted). Copyright is not moral right. See Gerstenblith, supra note 40,
at 439 ("The purposes of copyright and moral right are . . . fundamentally
different. Copyright is motivated exclusively by the benefit which the public is
to derive. Moral rights ... primarily vindicate the artist's individual rights,
while the public derives secondary benefits from the recognition of the artist's
rights.") (citations omitted).
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protected as "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" but likely
only to the extent that those features can exist independently of
the work's utilitarian function.8
At least for Kiley's public work, though, its utilitarian function
was a primary reason for its existence. His work was not a
collection of pieces, but a single piece. One author recently ana-
lyzed whether golf course holes, which "can be correctly classified
as artistic creations of landscape architecture," could be copy-
righted. He concluded that copyright was "not a feasible method
of protection" for golf holes, even if they "contain beautiful artistic
creations of landscape design," because "most hole features serve
a dual purpose of ornamentation and usefulness."90
At most, Kiley would have been able to copyright his designs
to prevent misappropriation by others. The plaintiff in Sparaco v.
Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Engineers LLP9' was a surveyor and
planner who was commissioned to draft a site plan for an assisted
living facility. The court said that the plaintiffs site plan
"included a basic survey map of the parcel of land, . . . a topo-
graphical survey," and a plan for the following improvements:
88 See Keri Christ, Edifice Complex: Protecting Landmark Buildings as
Intellectual Property-A Critique of Available Protections and a Proposal, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 1041, n.144 (2002) ("Monuments, interior designs and
landscape architecture have long been protected as 'pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works' to the extent that the pictorial, graphic and sculptural
features can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the design, under 17 U.S.C. § 101.")
(citation omitted).
9 Robert D. Howell, Tee'd Off-Golf Course Designers Score Double Bogey in
Search for Protection of Their Hole Designs, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 337,343 (1997).
Howell goes on to state that "[tihe courses' artistic nature is reflected in their
beauty and design .... Classification as a form of "art," however, does little to
advance a golf hole's chances of achieving copyrightability under [17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(5)]."). Id. See also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Limited, 155 F.3d 526
(5th Cir. 1998).
90Howell, supra note 89, at 345.
91303 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2002).92 Id.
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(1) the location and contour of the building footprint;
(2) location and contour of parking lots; (3) placement
and design of curbs, driveways, and walkways; (4)
placement of utilities and provision for sediment and
erosion control; (5) landscape design, including the
location for plants, trees, and lights; and (6) proposed
changes to the contours and elevation of the terrain.93
The plaintiff copyrighted the site plan.
When the plaintiff was removed from the project, the devel-
oper hired another firm to prepare a site plan. The new firm
essentially copied and submitted the plaintiffs work as its own.
The plaintiff sued, claiming that the defendants had created a
derivative work in violation of the Copyright Act.94 The district
court found that "copying the site plan would take nothing that is
protected by copyright."95
In reversing, the Second Circuit noted that the site plan
contained "renderings of two types of features: (1) the existing
physical characteristics of the site; and (2) proposals for physical
improvements to the site."9" As to the first feature, the court said
that "[t]o the extent that the site plan sets forth the existing
physical characteristics of the site.., it sets forth facts; copyright
does not bar the copying of such facts."97 As to the second, the court
said "the question whether there has been infringement... turn[s]
on whether the copying was only of the author's generalized ideas
and concepts or of the author's more precisely detailed realization
of those ideas."9" The plaintiffs
site plan specifie [d] more than vague, general indica-
tions of shape and placement of the elements. It
provide[d] detailed specifications for preparation of




S7Sparaco, 303 F.3d at 468.9 ld. at 467.
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the site. . . As such, it appear[ed] to be a fully
realized plan capable of being used, to guide actual
construction work on numerous site preparation
tasks. .. .9
The plan "included specific expression and realization of [plain-
tiffs] ideas, with the consequence that copying could constitute an
infringement of copyright."'1° However, the court's holding pro-
tected only the design, and not the integrity of the completed work,
from future modifications by other parties.
B. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act
In 1990, the Copyright Act was amended by the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act ("AWCPA").' 0 ' Architecture has
long been considered an art or, as one writer has stated more
succinctly, "the unavoidable art. Nobody has to listen to music, go
to museums, or attend the theater. Everybody, however, must live
with architecture. Virtually all architecture is public architecture
because its external forms are part of everybody's landscape. Thus,
architecture is important among the arts and the enterprises of
society." °2 Architecture is largely public art with a long-lived, if




1 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5133 (1990). The law was codified in scattered sections of title seventeen of the
United States Code. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 301 (2000).
102 Edward Anders Sivik, The Future of Callings-An Interdisciplinary Summit
on the Public Obligation of Professionals into the Next Millenium: Notes on the
Calling of an Architect, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189 (1999).
'o3 See Newsam, supra note 87, at 1076 ("[Alrchitecture is art and science....
The architectural design process proceeds from analysis to synthesis. The end
product contains both the rational and romantic; it can be, at the same time,
both innovative and imitative.") (citations omitted). See also Christ, supra note
88, at 1043 ("Architecture is a public art form that interacts with the public in
a unique way. Landmarks create and enhance public spaces, instill public pride,
and account for significant tourism revenue.").
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Prior to enactment of AWCPA, architects were entitled to
copyright their designs as "technical drawings" to the extent that
they were "works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects [were] con-
cerned."" 4 In addition, "three-dimensional models and nonfunc-
tional monumental works of architecture were protected as
sculptural works . . . because these works served as artistic
statements rather than as shelters."
10 5
AWCPA inserted its own definition of architectural work.
An "architectural work" is the design of a building as
embodied in any tangible medium of expression,
including a building, architectural plans, or draw-
ings. The work includes the overall form as well as
the arrangement and composition of spaces and
elements in the design, but does not include individ-
ual standard features. 0 6
104 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
105 Vanessa N. Scaglione, Building Upon the Architectural Works Protection
Copyright Act of 1990, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 193, 201 (1992). The completed
buildings were not accorded the same status. See, e.g., Calvin Tomkins, Profiles,
Man of Steel: Richard Serra, NEW YORKER, Aug. 5, 2002, at 52 ("I said that art
is purposely useless, that its significations are symbolic, internal, poetic...
whereas architects have to answer to the program, the client, and everything
that goes along with the utility function of the building." (quoting Serra)). See
also Krasilovsky, supra note 32, at 534-35.
Architectural design, although possessing communicative
elements, should be distinguished from visual art in terms of the
First Amendment. Architecture, unlike art, creates a permanent
addition to the aesthetic of an area, and may not be easily
removed. This poses a problem in terms of enjoining the speech
if it is found offensive or inappropriate.
Id. (citations omitted).
10617 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). This definition appears to be expansive. "[Aiccording
to legislative history, if the structure is meant to be inhabited by a human being,
even temporarily, as in the case of a gazebo, it is a building and therefore
qualifies as a copyrightable architectural work." Scaglione, supra note 105, at
197.
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The protection afforded, however, is limited. °7 For example, if the
building is in or is visible from a public place, anyone may make,
distribute, and "public[ally] display . . . pictures, paintings,
photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work."'0 5 In
addition, the building owner "may, without the consent of the
author or copyright owner of the architectural work, make or
authorize the making of alterations to such building, and destroy
or authorize the destruction of such building."'0 9
Consequently, even if Kiley's Lincoln Center design could have
been copyrighted under AWCPA, the violation of the work's inte-
grity could still have occurred without Kiley having any recourse.
But AWCPA does not apply to landscape design. And, perhaps,
that is how it should be. Landscape designers are not architects.
'o7 See Scaglione, supra note 105, at 195-96.
Three major problems exist with the Act and its legislative
history. First, the legislative history's definition . . . is too
restrictive and may exclude works deserving architectural
protection. Second, the legislative history's equivocal wording
leads to confusion as to whether architectural works can receive
dual protection as both sculptural and architectural works.
Finally, the Act's legislative history proposes a "functionality
test". . . [If design elements are determined by functional
considerations, they are not copyrightable.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Clark T. Thiel, The Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Gesture of 1990, Or, "Hey, That Looks Like My Building!",
7 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 1, 8-9 (1996).
Currently . . . a utilitarian or useful article qualifies for
copyright protection as to its form, but not its mechanical or
utilitarian aspects. . . . [An author can copyright artistic,
sculptural or decorative elements incorporated in a useful article
only if they are physically or conceptually separable from the
article .... making it difficult for the courts to separate an
article's form from its function.
Id. (citations omitted). This is a problem for architecture. Although the discipline
"has long been viewed as one of the fine arts.., most buildings serve utilitarian
functions." Newsam, supra note 87, at 1077.
108 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2000).
109 d. § 120(b).
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They deal with different questions in different ways."' Although
the noted architect Antoine Predock has said that "[aIrchitecture
is landscape in drag," the aims and techniques of the two fields are
completely different."' Even when a work commingles both, the
difference is habitation versus habitat. Architecture concerns the
former; landscape design the latter. Architecture produces a
commodity; landscape design provides a context." 2
It is true that both architecture and landscape design concern
the making of a place, but it is the use of that place at which the
110See Andrea 0. Dean, Listening to: Landscape Architects, ARCHITECTURAL REC.,
Aug. 1997, at 44.
[A] rchitects and landscape architects tend to approach projects
with different mindsets, the landscape architect being more
inclined to give at least as much weight to process as to product.
... [T]he architect represents the client, while the landscape
architect feels an obligation to also represent the interests of the
environment, the community, and even the culture.
Id.
"' Robert Campbell, Architecture As Geology? The Latest Definition Emerges,
ARCHITECTURAL REC., June 2003, at 16.
112 See Gregory B. Hancks, Copyright Protection for Architectural Design: A
Conceptual and Practical Criticism, 71 WASH. L. REV. 177, 191 (1996).
The AWCPA, however, takes no notice of the site-specific nature
of architectural design .... [I]t creates the false presumption
that sites are fungible-that buildings are commodities that can
be arbitrarily located on any site. The AWCPA places a value on
an architectural design completely divorced from the design's
context.
Id. Compare the Roden Crater project where, since 1974, a designer's "working
life has centered on the effort to turn an extinct volcano.., into a naked-eye
observatory for celestial events .... 'to capture and apprehend light' from the
sun and the moon and the stars-and also to demonstrate how we create and
form our perceptions of the visible world." Calvin Tomkins, Profiles, Flying Into
the Light, James Turrell, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 13, 2003, at 62. One observer
said the Roden Crater project "is one of the purest revelations of time and space
ever attempted, and it promises to make a landscape at such a vast and
otherwise undefinable scale that the true act of experiencing the earth will be
liberated within its confines." BETSKY, supra note 34, at 141 (citation omitted).
See id. at 146-49 for a picture of this project.
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line is drawn."3 Architecture can enclose, landscape design can
expose. Architecture results in a structure; landscape design
results in an image. Architecture is captured space; landscape
design is spatial organization. At their best, both architecture and
landscape design deserve protection, but the basis for that pro-
tection must recognize the differences in the art forms." 4
... See Campbell, supra note 111, at 62.
Architecture is certainly an art, but it is not principally the art
of sculptural form or beautifully proportioned facades. It differs
from all other arts in that its subject is places.... Architecture
is the art of all places intended for human habitation. One
experiences a work of architecture not by looking at it like a
painting, or even walking around it like a sculpture, but rather
by imaginatively inhabiting it.
Id. See also Raphael Winick, Copyright Protection for Architecture After the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 1615
(1992).
Organizations of space, such as gardens, parks, and golf courses
... should not be protected by the AWCPA. Works that are not
enclosed by any structure, although perhaps requiring much
time, effort, and expense for an architect to prepare, and having




14 See Gerstenblith, supra note 40, at 446-47.
[AWCPA's] legislative history indicates that the word "building"
should be interpreted broadly. As such, "buildings" include not
only structures inhabited by humans but also those used by
humans .... It has been suggested that.., protection should
not be extended.., to works such as gardens and parks which
represent primarily spatial organizations rather than enclosed
structures.
Id. See also Winick, supra note 113, at 1613.
Architecture critic Paul Goldberger has stated that the two
greatest works of architecture in New York City are Central
Park and the Brooklyn Bridge, neither of which would receive
protection under the AWCPA. Golf courses, gardens, tunnels,
bridges, overpasses, fences, and walls are only a few of the
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The different art forms, however, are compatible. Landscape
design can inform architecture. Kiley designed a landscape for the
Chicago Art Institute. One critic wrote that
[t]o understand such a Mecca of architecture as
Chicago, one should consider the small garden land-
scape architect Dan Kiley created in front of the
south wing of the Chicago Art Institute .... A few
feet below street level, surrounded by orthogonal
boxes that thrust up to the sky in celebration of
human achievement and measured by a grid of trees
that recalls the simple clarity with which we organize
the land to make such ambitious construction possi-
ble, this small garden is the essence of what we build
on the land."5
Unlike a building, the completed effect was not instantaneous
because the design took time to mature and thus to reveal."' In
addition, the effect was to complement, not supplant, the architec-
ture. It was, in essence, a frame, but it was also a work of art.
115 BETSKY, supra note 34, at 13. Chicago recently opened "a spectacular new
park and performance center" described as "the latest of the grand architectural
statements for which Chicago is renowned." Stephen Kinzer, A Prized Project,
a Mayor and Persistent Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at A12. The park,
"Chicago's $475 million celebration of design," includes a 2.5 acre garden created
by Kathryn Gustafson, "the American-born landscape architect known for her
sculptured parks and lively waterworks" reflecting "her bold, minimalist sensi-
bility." Anne Raver, Softening a City With Grit and Grass, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2004, at Fl.
"
16See Spirn, Seeing and Making, supra note 46, at 92 ("It is... no surprise that
the landscape, particularly the public landscape, is undervalued in the United
States. Landscapes are not readily perceived as objects; they may take years to
mature, requiring careful attention and ample resources. Buildings, by contrast,
provide immediate gratification...."). See also Muschamp, If Not Utopia, supra
note 12, at C29 ("[H]istorically, we have tended to see a building as the picture,
the landscape as its frame. But today there's wider recognition that frames
possess inherent interest. Frame-making is itself an art form; a frame can
powerfully affect our experience of the object it encloses.").
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There was art in Kiley's landscape designs. He was not a
gardener, although gardening informed his work. 117 He was an
artist who revealed or embodied the spirit of the places where he
worked. He created a place, not a structure-an idea visualized,
rather than a building realized."' His work was dynamic and open,
not completed and enclosed." 9 It was not architecture as defined
by Congress, and its protection merits more than that which
Congress has provided for architecture. 20
117 See BETSKY, supra note 34, at 24.
Landscape architecture today is not simply about planting
flowers and creating outdoor spaces with plants .... [Ilt is the
act of scraping off the products of human interference on the
land to reveal the nature of a place.... This is the most efficient
and . . . the most utopian form of architecture . . . one that
restores nature and our understanding of it to a prominent
position in our culture.
Id.118 See id. at 13.
Many landscape architects today see their practices as a way of
unearthing and clarifying what already exists. . . . [Tihey
combine human shaping with the force of the land. Landscape
architecture that exists at the intersection of the geological, the
geographical and the human is the most fundamental exposition
of architecture I know.
Id.
"
9 See James S. Russell, Landscape Urbanism: It's the Future, Not a Contra-
diction, ARCHITECTURAL REC., Aug. 2001, at 70, 72.
It's easier for landscape architects to accept process as product
because they are used to dealing with a living entity that will
change over time no matter what .... "A building doesn't die if
it doesn't get water or sunshine. Landscape architecture is
feral-it's about design thinking, but it's always partly wild."
Id.
120 See Gerstenblith, supra note 40, at 449.
[T]he right of integrity . . . was specifically denied to archi-
tectural works. This was done so that a building owner could
alter or destroy the building without seeking a transfer of the
copyrights from the owner of the copyright or the architect....
The AWCPA's potential to preserve architectural works is thus
nullified.
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C. Visual Artists Rights Act
When Congress enacted AWCPA, it also enacted the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA"). 121 A "work of visual art"
includes "a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture" existing as a
single copy or in limited editions. 122 The artist is afforded special
rights including a right of integrity enabling the artist "to prevent
any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,
and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that
work is a violation of that right." 23 If the work is one "of recognized
stature," the artist has a right "to prevent any destruction of [that]
work... and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of
that work is a violation of that right." 24 However, if the modifica-
tion results from "the passage of time or the inherent nature of the
materials," that is not a violation. 2 ' If the modification results
from "conservation" or "public presentation," there is no violation
"unless the modification is caused by gross negligence. "126
121 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
The law was codified in scattered sections of title seventeen of the United States
Code. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 411-12, 501, 506 (2000).
122 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). For a recent history of VARA, see Christopher R.
Mathews, VARA's Delicate Balance and the Crucial Role of the Waiver Provision:
Its Current State and Its Future, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 139, 140-42 (2003).
123 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2000).
12417 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2000). See Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
Works of recognized stature, within the meaning of VARA, are
those works of artistic merit that have been "recognized" by
members of the artistic community and/or the general public..
.. To achieve VARA protection, an artist must show not only the
work's artistic merit but also that it has been recognized as
having such merit.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Keshawn M. Harry, Note, A Shattered
Visage: The Fluctuation Problem with the Recognized Stature Provision in the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 193 (2001).
125 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) (2000).
12617 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2000).
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VARA offers more protection to architectural works that are
not utilitarian but monumental, defined as sculptural works that
are aesthetic, not functional.'27 VARA acknowledges the public
interest in encouraging and preserving aesthetic work; if the work
is visual art, VARA protects the public interest by empowering the
artist with authority to protect the work's integrity.
12
VARA leaves much to judicial interpretation. 129 In Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 3 ° the Second Circuit made an early and
highly influential interpretation. The plaintiffs, three professional
sculptors, had created "a very large 'walk-through sculpture'
occupying most, but not all," of a lobby in a building owned by the
127 See Thiel, supra note 107, at 35-36 ("[Blecause [VARA] covers sculptural
works, architects creating nonfunctional architecture enjoy considerably more
protection than those creating useful architectural works. This dichotomy
reintroduces the problem of classifying structures as either functional or
aesthetic, and providing significantly different protection based on this
determination."). See also Scaglione, supra note 105, at 203; Melissa M. Mathis,
Function, Nonfunction, and Monumental Works of Architecture: An Interpretive
Lens in Copyright Law, 22 CARDOzO L. REV. 595 (2001).128 See Christopher J. Robinson, The "Recognized Stature"Standard in the Visual
Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1936 (2000).
VARA recognizes a public interest in the encouragement of
artists to work and in the preservation of their work once
created. Appealing to the public interest on a narrow front
helped ensure the passage of the legislation .... Public interest
thus justified the intervention of federal law into what many
considered a private contractual matter.
Id. This public interest, however, may encounter other interests. See Garson,
supra note 42, at 205 ("[I]nterpreting VARA to allow a government-
commissioned artist to prevent the removal of her site-specific artwork would
potentially bind public property indefinitely. . . .Unfettered moral rights
protection for such artists would effectively privatize public land-and a lot of
it.").
129 See Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American
Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 410 (1995).
The House Committee report on VARA does, however, leave to
the courts the more detailed work of defining what qualifies as
a [protected work] .... [C]ourts are not locked into narrow
definitions and can "find" that certain category-defying works fit
into one of the types of work protected by VARA.
Id. (citations omitted).
130 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
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defendants.'31 When the defendants told the sculptors that they
intended to remove the work, the sculptors sued for an injunction
under VARA. 13
2
The court, finding it "necessary to review briefly the concept
of artists' moral rights" and its influence on VARA, said that the
term had
its origins in the civil law and is a translation of the
French le droit moral, which is meant to capture
those rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal
nature. The rights spring from a belief that an artist
in the process of creation injects his spirit into the
work and that the artist's personality, as well as the
integrity of the work, should therefore be protected
and preserved.... Because they are personal to the
artist, moral rights exist independently of an artist's
copyright in his or her work.
133
The court said "the right of integrity allows the author to prevent
any deforming or mutilating changes to his work, even after title
in the work has been transferred.
" 134
The court's first task was to "determine whether the trial court
correctly found that the work is a single piece of art, to be analyzed
under VARA as a whole, rather than separate works to be consid-
ered individually."'35 This finding, "a factual one," was correct; the
31Id. at 80. The court described the piece as follows:
The artwork consists of a variety of sculptural elements
constructed from recycled materials, much of it metal, affixed to
the walls and ceiling, and a vast mosaic made from pieces of
recycled glass embedded in the floor and walls. Elements of the
work include a giant hand fashioned from an old school bus, a
face made of automobile parts, and a number of interactive
components. These assorted elements make up a theme relating
to environmental concerns and the significance of recycling.
Id.
132 Id.
13 Id. at 81 (internal citations omitted).
134 Id.
135 Carter, 71 F.3d at 83.
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sculpture "was a thematically consistent, inter-related work whose
elements could not be separated without losing continuity and
meaning." "' However, the court ultimately concluded that the
sculptors were employees of the defendants, making the work one
done for hire, and, therefore, not protected by VARA.' 37
VARA's definition of visual art could, with some sympathetic
interpretation, encompass Kiley's landscape designs. It has been
argued that "environmental art can be classified as sculpture" as
"the conceptual basis is the same as it is for all art-to relate to
people in perhaps an inarticulable and intangible, but very real,
136Id. at 83-84.
137 Id. at 88. In reaching this conclusion, the court said that
while the existence of payroll formalities alone would not be
controlling.., in combination with other factors, it may lead to
a conclusion that a given work is one made for hire. Such other
factors include: plaintiffs under their contract could be and were
in fact assigned projects in addition to the work in the lobby;
they were paid a weekly salary for over two years for a
contracted 40 hours of work per week; they were furnished
many of the needed supplies necessary to create the work; and
plaintiffs could not hire paid assistants without defendants'
consent. These factors, properly considered and weighed with
the employee benefits granted plaintiffs and the tax treatment
accorded them, are more than sufficient to demonstrate that the
artists were employees, and the sculpture is therefore a work
made for hire as a matter of law.
Id. at 87-88 (internal citation omitted). See Benjamin S. Hayes, Note, Integrating
Moral Rights into U.S. Law and the Problem of the Work for Hire Doctrine, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1020 (2000).
[Ilt seems that American courts are instinctively hostile to the
right of integrity, and have relied on the work for hire doctrine
to avoid granting it. Common law courts have always been
loathe to infer servitudes, and the right of integrity is basically
a form of equitable servitude.... Thus, the right of integrity
may well meet strong resistance from the courts on the theory
that it is inconsistent with the free alienablity of property.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Colleen Creamer Fielkow, Clashing Rights
Under United States Copyright Law: Harmonizing an Employer's Economic
Right with the Artist-Employee's Moral Rights in a Work Made for Hire, 7
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 218 (1997).
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way."138 The judgment exercised in such works is artistic, the
resulting composition can be considered visual art. 1
39
Kiley's work was not an object created for or placed in a
certain space. 4 ° His work was the site, the adding and removing,
the shaping and revealing that produces a genus loci, a spirit of the
place. The result was a singular expression, not just the addition
of a free standing piece. Yet VARA does not appear to protect the
integrity of landscape art.
3
' Jay Orlandi, Comment, Gargoyles in Gotham: A Sculpture Incorporated into
an Architectural Work Should Retain Independent Copyright Protection, 29 Sw.
U. L. REV. 617,623 (2000). See also Michael Kimmelman, Modernism Wasn't So
American After All, N.Y. TiMES, July 2, 2004, at E27.
Much of this [exhibit] entails developments in sculpture, which
during this time [the 1940s through the 1970s] came to include
almost anything and everything. The exhibition demonstrates
how sculpture changed back then from something static, three-
dimensional and made mostly out of traditional materials like
stone or wood or clay into a medium that pretty much defied
definition.
Id.
139See Russell, supra note 119 (stating that a landscape architect, describing how
she "artfully composed the soil," said her "peers say I'm more of sculptor than a
landscape architect"). See also JACKSON, supra note 17, at 299-300 ("Just as the
painter used his judgment as to what to include or omit in his composition, the
landscape gardener.., took pains to produce a stylized 'picturesque' landscape
.... The results were often extremely beautiful, but they were still pictures,
though in three dimensions.").
140 See BETSKY, supra note 34, at 140.
Site-specific work means to reveal the nature of its location in
time and space, the history of its making, the hand of its maker,
and the cultural assumptions that maker and viewer bring to an
experience of the work .... The work creates an environment,
but is also an object (or set of objects) in its own right.
Id. See also Garson, supra note 42, at 230.
Since site-specific artwork is designed for a particular place, it
is inherently dependant on its context .... [T]he site is the
readymade work, from which the artist draws her inspiration,
and upon which the artist adds a crafted material. Together, the
readymade and the crafted material exist as the artwork.
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Landscape art is not land art.14 ' Land art is created to be
observed; landscape art is created to be used. Land art is often
created away from population; landscape art is almost always
created within a population. The observer does not have to trek to
experience landscape design; it is an aspect of the observer's daily
life.142
Landscape art could, with some imagination, be regarded as
sculpture. Designers and sculptors select what to reveal, use their
skills to effect the revealing, and use their techniques to refine
what is revealed. Both are visual artists.
[Tihe visual artist, whatever the medium, expresses
a view of the world. In a very real sense, the artist
141 SeeBETSKY, supra note 34, at 13.
Land artists of the 1960s and 1970s pointed the way toward a
reduction of human marks in or on the land .... The pure
abstraction of such pieces makes us aware of the relationship
between the land and our own construction. We experience a
tension between what we know through our rational senses and
what we feel is present on a site.
Id. Compare id. at 8-9:
Just as a sculptor chisels away at a rock, the architect selects
which strata to reveal, polishes them to change their appear-
ance, and hones them down to show new forms that were always
inherent in the material itself. Architecture in this sense is not
the making of something new, but the reformation of what
already exists in a form that accepts the mark of human
intervention.
142 See Michael Kimmelman, Art's Last, Lonely Cowboy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb.
6, 2005, at 33; Melissa Sanford, The Salt Of the Earth Sculpture, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2004, at El (discussing Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty, an earth
sculpture built into the Great Salt Lake in Utah at a point "about 100 miles
northwest of Salt Lake City, on state-owned land accessible by a 15-mile dirt
road with giant potholes that can trap small cars; four-wheel drive is recom-
mended"). See also John Rockwell, Preserve Performance Art? Can You Preserve
the Wind?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at E5; Simon Schama, The Stone
Gardener: A Land Artist Comes to Lower Manhattan, NEW YORKER, Sept. 22,
2003, at 126-27 ("Land art was to be landscape's come-uppance. The place would
own the beholder, not the other way around, since to experience [it] ... one had
to travel a very long way from Madison Avenue.").
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imposes her own order upon nature and the universe.
When an artist creates, she is shaping a new reality,
a form to signify a feeling, and a certain order among
perceptions and sensations .... [Firom the perspec-
tive of the audience artistic expression functions to
eliminate mankind's alienation from nature through
communication by symbols.,
3
Landscape designers are visual artists, possessing an "ability to
see, feel, and think-all with clarity-and to communicate visually
as well as verbally."'" Done as Kiley did it, landscape design is
art.
45
Richard Serra, perhaps America's greatest living sculptor, says
that his work, monumental in scale, "is not creating static objects
but shaping space" to be experienced by walking through or around
it. 46 Unlike literature or music, Serra's work, like Kiley's, is not
meant to be replicated, copied, or distributed, a situation that
143 Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful,
The Sublime, and The First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 221, 223 (1987)
(citations omitted). See also Marcus C. Johnson, Note, Let Freedom Reign, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 485, 503 (2001) ("Courts have confirmed the high place that
visual art occupies among expressive activities.... [T]he viewer may not always
interpret the artwork the way the artist intended. In fact, artistic expression is
a powerful communicative tool precisely because it is capable of evoking a
variety of interpretations from viewers.").
144 NEWTON, supra note 48, at 391.
145 See WALKER & SIMO, supra note 36, at 318 ("[A]lthough the works we have
considered are not all masterpieces, many are works of art. Together they bear
witness to a continuing quest for beauty, meaning, mystery, and the perhaps
unattainable garden of myth.")
14'Tomkins, supra note 105, at 52. See Carol Vogel, A $20 Million Bilbao Project
for Serra, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at E27; Andrew Blum, A Serra Sculpture
Emerges From Its Tomb, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at AR45. Serra stated that
"[t]o protect your work and be responsible for your work is a lifetime job. There's
always something. There's always the cow that knocks over the fence." Id. Serra
was involved in one of the most significant pre-VARA cases, where the cow
knocked over a fence he created. See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d
1045 (2d Cir. 1988). For Serra's account of this, see Richard Serra, The Tilted
Arc Controversy, 19 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 39 (2001).
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VARA was, in part, designed to address. 47 A significant difference
between much of Serra's work and Kiley's is that Serra's can be
removed from its site without destruction."4 Kiley's work was the
site. It cannot be removed and exhibited in another place; its place
is its art. There is an indissoluble relationship between place and
expression. Kiley's work was not plopped down on a site; it was
developed from the site. Kiley's work made the site sculpture. It
made the site a focused and embracing experience for the viewer.
But is it protected visual art? It is art, it is visual, and it is, for the
most part, public, but it does not appear to be protected by VARA.
The scope of VARA's protection is often court-determined. The
artist in Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc. '49 was a sculptor
commissioned to create a large statue of the Queen, the namesake
of the borough of Queens in New York City. 5 ° While working on
the project, the artist completed a clay model of the Queen's head
which was to be used in casting the final bronze figure. The project
then entered a long period of uncertainty and, unknown to the
147See Robinson, supra note 128, at 1936.
Fine art is unique among the arts in one important sense. A
disproportionate percentage of the value.., is in the physical
object created, rather than the exploitation of derivatives or
copies. Damage to the original object is prejudicial to an artist's
ability to exploit the object for his enhanced honor and repu-
tation, in a way not true for an author of a literary work or
musical composition. VARA was an attempt to compensate
visual artists for this imbalance in copyright law.
Id. (citations omitted).
1
"This is not always true. See Tomkins, supra note 105, at 58.
Although Serra would not become an earth artist.., shaping
the landscape in remote areas, he was impressed by the scale
and the evocative power of ... these projects, and they were
certainly in his mind when . . . the piece got finished-three
sixty-foot-long Corten-steel plates set into a field at precisely
calibrated angles, which made the landscape into a work of
sculpture embracing space, time, and the walking viewer.
Id.
149 139 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Sarah E. Botha, Art Conser-
vation: Problems Encountered in an Unregulated Industry, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 251, 267-69 (2003).
150 Flack, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
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artist, the model was stored outside where it was damaged by the
elements. Although the artist offered to resculpt the head, her
assistant was hired instead to do that work. When the artist sued,
her complaint alleged that the result "was a 'distorted, mutilated
model' in which, among other matters, the nose, nostrils, eyes and
lips are uneven and the wrong size."15'
The defendants did not "seriously dispute that the head...
[was] a 'sculpture, existing in a single copy,"' thus meeting VARA's
definition of visual art.'52 However, VARA excludes certain models
from protection. The question for the court was whether the head
was an excluded model.
To decide the question, the court turned to the following
language from a House Report regarding VARA:
The courts should use common sense and generally
accepted standards of the artistic community in de-
termining whether a particular work falls within the
scope of the definition. Artists may work in a variety
of media, and use any number of materials in creat-
ing their works. Therefore, whether a particular work
falls within the definition should not depend on the
medium or materials used.5 3
151Flack, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 530.152Id. at 532.
15' Id. at 533. But see Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Productions, Inc., 1992 WL
168836 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
While the parties here do not dispute that such works as
puppets, costumes and sets may be copyrightable, that question
is not dispositive .... By its terms, VARA does not include
puppets, costumes or sets, which arguably might be considered
"visual art." We will not read into VARA that which Congress
has evidently chosen to leave out, for, having included extensive
categories of works that do or do not constitute "visual art,"
Congress could have included works such as puppets, costumes
and sets if it desired to afford them the protections of section
106A.
Id. at *4 (internal citation omitted).
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The court concluded. that "[i]n the artistic community, 'models'
such as the clay sculpture are considered works of art in their own
right.",1 4 The contrary conclusion "would lead to an absurd result"
because "then sculptors would enjoy less protection than photogra-
phers and painters, even though all three types of artists.. . were
the intended beneficiaries of VARA."' 55
The Second Circuit in Pollara v. Seymour confronted the
question of whether the plaintiffs work, "a banner, approximately
ten feet high and thirty feet long," was VARA-protected visual
art.'56 The banner, commissioned by a non-profit group providing
legal services to the poor, was designed to protest, in words and
pictures, the lack of state funding for such services. The banner,
which was erected in a public square on state grounds, was subse-
quently removed and destroyed by state employees. The artist then
sued the state under VARA.
The court said "VARA protects only things defined as 'work[s]
of visual art,'.., a definition that is 'a critical underpinning of the
limited scope of [VARA].'"'5" Congress had instructed the courts "to
'use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic
community in determining whether a particular work falls within
the scope of the definition. ' ""5 So, was the artist's banner a work
of visual art eligible for protection under VARA? The court said it
was not:
Protection of a work under VARA will often depend,
as it does here, upon the work's objective and evident
purpose. VARA does not protect advertising, promo-
tional, or utilitarian works, and does not protect
works for hire, regardless of their artistic merit, their
medium, or their value to the artist or the market..
• .VARA may protect a sculpture that looks like a
l"Flack, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (citations omitted).
155 Id. at 534 (citations omitted).
156 344 F.3d 265, 266 (2d Cir. 2003).
1 57 Id. at 269 (internal citation omitted).
158Id.
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piece of furniture, but it does not protect a piece of
utilitarian furniture, whether or not it could arguably
be called a sculpture. Drawings and paintings are
protected, but only if they do not advertise or pro-
mote. 159
Because the artist's banner "was created for the purpose of
promoting and advertising," it was not a VARA-protected work. 6 °
A non-fanciful argument can be made that Kiley's Lincoln
Center work was sculptural and thus protected by VARA.' The
plaintiffs in English v. BFC & R East 11th Street LLC'62 were six
artists who had adorned a community garden by painting murals
on walls around it and placing sculpture in it. 63 The space, which
had been city owned, was sold to a private developer. The artists
sued to prevent development of the garden claiming, in part, that
"the Garden itself constitutes a single work of art. They describe
it as 'a large environmental sculpture encompassing the entire site
and comprised of thematically interrelated paintings, murals, and
individual sculptures of concrete, stone, wood and metal, and
plants.'"'" They argued that the garden was protected by VARA.
The court took the artists' claim seriously, saying "the merits
of the litigation turns in part on whether the Garden is conceived
of as a single work of Visual Art." Whether the Garden constituted
"a single piece of art, to be analyzed under VARA as a whole,
rather than separate works to be considered individually," was a
'
59 Id. (internal citations omitted).
160Id. at 270.
161See Pilar Viladas, The Constant Gardener, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 16, 2004, at
39, 39-40. Belgian landscape artist Jacques Wirtz is
[r]enowned for his sculptural treatment of time-honored garden
staples... he has done for them what Richard Serra has done
for steel-Wirtz also possesses a virtuoso knowledge of plants
and flowers. His painterly handling of light and shadow, like
that of 17th-century Flemish painters, gives him "a great power
to evoke space"....
Id. (quoting Spanish landscape designer Fernando Caruncho).
162 1997 WL 746444 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
163 Id. at *1.
164Id.
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question of fact. 65 However, the court did not answer that question
because the artists could not "claim a protectable interest in the
Garden itself-even were it deemed to be a single unified work of
art-because it was illegally placed on City property.
" 166
Had the court concluded that the garden was VARA-protected
visual art, the protection afforded would have been limited. During
an artist's lifetime, he or she can act "to prevent any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation."16 7 If the
work is one "of recognized stature," the artist may act "to prevent
any destruction of [the] work."' However, any "modification of a
work of visual art which is a result of the passage of time or the
inherent nature of the materials is not a distortion, mutilation, or
other modification."'69 In addition, any "modification of a work of
visual art which is the result of conservation, or of the public
presentation . . . of the work is not a destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification ... unless the modification is
caused by gross negligence."7 °
Moreover, even the intentional destruction of a work of
recognized stature brings only limited relief under VARA. The
artist in Martin v. City of Indianapolis7 ' had erected a large metal
sculpture on private land later acquired by the city as part of its
urban renewal plan. Although the artist had designed the piece to
be disassembled in case it needed to be moved, the city had the
piece demolished without prior notice to the artist. The artist then
sued under VARA.
Because the work had been destroyed, the primary question
was whether it had been one of "recognized stature," a term which
was "not defined in VARA, leaving its intended meaning and
165Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted).
166 Id. at *5.
167 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2000). These rights "shall endure for a term
consisting of the life of the author." Id. § 106A(d).16 Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
169Id. § 106A(c)(1).
17°Id. § 106A(c)(2).
171 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
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application open to argument and judicial resolution."17 2 The court
elected to apply the following test, which requires
(1) that the visual art in question has "stature," i.e.
is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that this stature is
"recognized" by art experts, other members of the
artistic community, or by some cross-section of
society. In making this showing, plaintiffs generally,
but not inevitably, will need to call expert witnesses
to testify before the trier of fact.'73
The artist's problem in Martin was that his work "was destroyed
by the City without the opportunity for experts to appraise the
sculpture in place."7 4
The artist did submit "certain newspaper and magazine
articles, and various letters, including a letter from an art gallery
director and a letter to the editor" which he said supported the
sculpture's stature as a recognized work. 7 5 The court affirmed that
the artist "had met his 'stature' burden of proof' with this evi-
dence. 176 However, despite "the City's conduct resulting in the
intentional destruction of the sculpture," the court did not con-
sider "that the City's conduct was 'wilful' . . . so as to entitle the
plaintiffto enhanced damages." 77 The court said that such conduct
"appear[ed] to be a case of bureaucratic failure within the City
government, not a wilful violation of plaintiffs VARA rights .... As
unfortunate as the City's unannounced demolition.., was, it [did]
not qualify plaintiff for damages under VARA." 78
The artist was awarded the maximum amount of statutory
damages for a non-wilful violation, plus attorney's fees and costs.
1721Id. at 612.
173Id. (quoting Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y.
1994)).
174 Martin, 192 F.3d at 612.
175Id.
176 Id. (internal citation omitted).
177 Id. at 614.
178 Id.
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But that was, as the trial court acknowledged, small relief for the
injury suffered.179
III. STATE PROTECTION?
Many states have VARA-like statutes and, in fact, had them
prior to VARA's enactment. 8 0 However, the protection offered by
the state statutes is limited by VARA's preemption provision.
On or after the effective date... of the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the rights conferred... with
respect to works of visual art... are governed exclu-
sively by [VARA] .... Thereafter, no person is enti-
tled to any such right or equivalent right in any work
of visual art under the common law or statutes of any
State.'8'
179 See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 4 F. Supp. 2d 808, 812 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
Although we have awarded Martin the full statutory damages
available to him, we recognize that $20,000 does not compensate
Martin fully for the complete loss of his artwork.... [WIe are
confident that the statutory maximum... does not cover the
loss caused by the City's destruction of a large-scale, unique
sculpture .... If we did not award costs and fees in plaintiffs
favor, it would have the effect of reducing further the adequacy
of the damages award .... An award of attorney's fees is also
warranted in this case to encourage artists like Martin to assert
their VARA rights in court. In addition, we hope and expect that
by awarding attorney's fees to Martin it will serve to deter
municipalities and others from wantonly destroying works of art
... in future development projects.
Id.
18 See, e.g., Cambra E. Stern, Comment, A Matter of Life or Death: The Visual
Artists Rights Act and the Problem of Postmortem Moral Rights, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 849, 854-55 (2004); Edward J. Damich, A Comparison of State and Federal
Moral Rights Protection: Are Artists Better OffAfter VARA?, 15 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 953 (1993); Brian T. McCartney, "Creepings"and "Glimmers" of the
Moral Rights of Artists in American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35
(1998).
18117 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1) (2000). See Mathews, supra note 117, at 166-68; Joshua
H. Brown, Note, Creators Caught in the Middle: Visual Artists Rights Act
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A state statute might still apply if the work was created before
VARA's effective date but after the state statute's effective date.
8 2
The effect of preemption is illustrated in Board of Managers of
SoHo International Arts Condominium v. City of New York. 8 3 The
condominium managers wanted to remove a work of visual art
installed on the building's exterior in 1973. The managers sought
a declaratory judgment that the artist had no rights under either
VARA or a similar state statute.
The court said that "Congress enacted VARA in 1990 in order
to protect 'the reputations of certain visual artists and the works
of art they create.""" The artist in this case was "seeking to use
VARA to enforce his right of 'integrity,' i.e., the right to protect the
Work from modification or destruction which would prejudice his
artistic honor or reputation.' 8 5
The court, though, refused to resolve the VARA question.
Because the work had been made a part of the building, the court
said the key issue was "whether the Work is removable or non-
removable"; VARA "contemplates one scheme of protection for
non-removable works" and another for works "whose removal from
the structure would not destroy, distort or mutilate them."8 6
The court, with some exasperation, found "that the record con-
tain[ed] no evidence addressing the consequences of removing the
Preemption of State Moral Rights Laws, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1003
(1993).
..
2See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(a) (2000); Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Ams. Assocs., 901
F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp.
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). But see Grauer v. Deutsch, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1636, 1637
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Plaintiffs vague claim that the state statute is not preempted
by the VARA because it conceivably might be construed to provide greater and
different relief is insufficient.").
183 2003 WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court subsequently upheld
restoration of the sculpture, denying the owner's claim of a First Amendment
violation. 2004 WL 1982520 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). See David W. Dunlap, 'Wall'
Dispute in SoHo Lands in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at B4.
'
4Soho Int'l Arts Condominium, 2003 WL 21403333, at *7 (citation omitted).
'Id. (citation omitted).
186 Id. at *8-9.
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[Work] .,,17 The court therefore had no evidentiary basis for a ruling
and denied both parties' motions for summary judgment under
VARA.
The court then turned to New York's Artists' Authorship
Rights Act, noting that it appeared "to confer substantially similar
rights" to those conferred by VARA, thus requiring the court to
"turn to the question of pre-emption."' The court said VARA's
legislative history said it would preempt state law "if two condi-
tions are met: 1) if the work... falls within the 'subject matter' of
copyright as specified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 and 2) if the
right is the same or 'equivalent' to those granted by VARA."1 9
In this case, it was "beyond doubt that § 102 expressly
includ[ed] within its definition of copyrightable material a
sculptural work such as the one at issue here."9 ° The state statute
also "grants artists rights 'equivalent' to those contained in
VARA. '"9' The court concluded that "any state statute enacted to
protect artists' moral rights, specifically those of attribution or
integrity (and even those which afford greater protections to
artists), would be pre-empted by VARA."19 2
187Id. at *10.
1 ld. at * 11 (citations omitted). See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (Consol.
1991). See also Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists'Authorship Rights Act:
A Comparative Critique, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1733 (1984).
"
89Soho Int'l Arts Condominium, 2003 WL 21403333, at *12 (internal citations
omitted).
19 0Id. at * 13 (citation omitted).
191 Id.
192Id. The court held that VARA's legislative history clearly supported the result.
[11f a State attempted to grant an author the rights of
attribution or integrity for works of visual art as defined in this
Act, those laws will be preempted. For example, the new law
will preempt a State law granting the right of integrity in
paintings or sculpture, even if the State law is broader than
Federal law, such as by providing a right of attribution or
integrity with respect to covered works without regard to injury
to the author's honor or reputation.
Id. (internal citation omitted). See also Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Moral Rights
and Moral Righteousness, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 65, 85 (1997) ("[Alllow-
ing state extension generally into areas of moral right not now covered by the
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Although preemption would seem to be a primary issue
whenever a VARA-type claim is made under a state statute, it is
not an issue if the work is not considered VARA-protected visual
art. Preemption was not even mentioned in Phillips v. Pembroke
Real Estate, Inc.,"' a case raising "novel and important issues
about the rights of artists" under both VARA and Massachusetts'
Art Preservation Act ("MAPA"). 194 In 1999, the artist was commis-
sioned to work on the creation of a park, in which he agreed to
create and place twenty-seven sculptures. Working closely with
the landscape architect, the artist helped design paths, walls, and
other features. He also had final say on the siting of the sculptures.
Within a year of completion, the owner decided to redesign the
park and remove all of the artist's work. The artist sued for injunc-
tive relief under both VARA and MAPA.
Starting with VARA, the court stated "[tihe first question is
whether [the artist's] twenty-seven (27) sculptures constitute a
single work of visual art or instead are discrete works of art."95
Related to this question was "whether the Park as a whole should
be treated as a work of visual art." 6
federal laws, particularly extension beyond unique, single copy works of visual
art is an invitation to legal-aesthetic chaos.").
193 288 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2003).
194Id. at 92. Massachusetts' Art Preservation Act is based on a finding
that the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is
an expression of the artist's personality, is detrimental to the
artist's reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in
protecting their works of fine art against such alteration or
destruction; and that there is also a public interest in preserving
the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(a) (West 2004). Fine art is defined as "any
original work of visual or graphic art of any media which shall include, but not
limited to, any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft object, photograph,
audio or video tape, film, hologram, or any combination thereof, of recognized
quality." Id. § 85S(b). To determine whether a work "is of recognized quality, the
court shall rely on the opinions of artist[s], art dealers, collectors of fine art,
curators of art museums, restorers and conservators of fine art and other
persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art." Id. § 85S(f).
'95 Id. at 97.
196 Id. See Garson, supra note 42, at 239.
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Relying on "the integrated marine theme and recurring
spirals, as well as the use of marine granite boulders and pavers,"
the court, found that a certain number of the sculptures were "one
integrated 'work of visual art.m19 7 However, the remaining sculp-
tures "that do not lie along the axis are not part of the same work
of visual art."198 They were "individual free-standing pieces of
sculpture, which are not integrated into the other pieces by spirals
or granite."'99
The court rejected the argument "that the Park as a whole
is a work of visual art."20 0 The park did "not fit within the tradi-
tional definition of sculpture" although, the court acknowledged,
"a sculptor could design a sculpture garden that includ[ed] mul-
tiple inter-related sculptural elements that form [ed] an integrated
work of visual art."' ' In this case, however, the artist did not
It is clear that the community of respected American artists and
art authorities regard the crafted work and the site of site-
specific artworks as an indivisible whole. The artists who create
these works explain that the meaning and purpose behind the'
art lie squarely within its physical location. They are clear that
relocation of the work destroys its meaning and purpose,
effectively obliterating its existence.
Id.
197 Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
198 Id.
1991d. But see John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property,
77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 356 (1989) [hereinafter Merryman, Cultural Property].
Physical preservation of discrete objects themselves may not be
enough. Every cultural object is to some extent a part of a larger
context from which it draws, and to which it adds, meaning.
Separated from its context ... the object and the context both
lose significance. At the extreme the object becomes anonymous,
an orphan without reliable indication of its origin, its signifi-
cance, its place and function as a part of something else.
Id.
200 Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
201 Id. (internal citation omitted). After Kiley designed a sculpture garden in
Kansas City to display the work of Henry Moore, one critic asked:
But this is a sculpture garden, is it not? And one given over
entirely to work that does a good job of domination when
domination is called for? So where does the garden stop and the
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himself create "many elements in the Park" and "[s]ubstantial
areas of the Park [were] unrelated to [the] sculpture and not
integrated with it." °2 The artist was "not responsible for the
plantings or any of the landscape architecture apart from the stone
elements."2 3 Although the artist "certainly assisted in designing
the stone elements in the paths and walls and in placing his own
sculptures, the Park as a whole is not an integrated work of art."20 4
Turning to the state statute, the court said "[tihe rarely-
litigated [MIAPA] provides broader protection to artists than"
VARA. 205 MAPA's "definition of 'fine art'... is significantly more
expansive than the definition of 'work of visual art' in VARA
because it is not limited to the specific enumerated types of art
(i.e., sculpture) and expressly includes art forms not covered by
sculpture begin? "Nowhere" is the answer, because this is not a
peremptory sculpture garden. It is a confidential sculpture
garden, a place of secrets and seclusions where the duet of art
and nature is perfectly in tune.
John Russell, Moore Sculptures in a Kansas City Garden, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1989, at C13.
202 Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
2 03 Id.
201 Id. But see Rebecca J. Martel, The Should-It-Stay or Should-It-Go Spotlight:
Protection of Site-Specific Work under VARA, 13 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.
101, 119 (2003).
If the work was created for a specific surrounding and the
meaning of the work is based on those surroundings, the artist's
chosen public presentation of the work is where it is because
that is where the work was created to reside. Therefore, by
changing the placement of the artwork, the whole meaning of
the work changes and it is no longer the same sculpture with the
same expression.
Id.
205 Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 100. See Mathews, supra note 122, at 161-66;
Laura Nakashima, Comment, Visual Artists' Moral Rights in the United States:
An Analysis of the Overlooked Need for States to Take Action, 41 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 203 (2000). For example, the rights granted under VARA last only "for
a term consisting of the life of the author." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2000). MAPA
says its provisions "shall, with respect to the artist, or if any artist is deceased,
his heir, legatee, or personal representative, continue until the fiftieth
anniversary of the death of such artist." MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(g)
(West 2004).
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VARA." 2 0 6 Because of MAPA's elastic definition of "fine art," the
court concluded that "a 'park' can be a work of 'visual art' under
the statute."2 °7 However, because the artist presented "only con-
clusory evidence as to whether the quality of the Park design itself
has been 'recognized' by a cross-section .of the artistic community
or by artistic experts in the field," the artist had failed to show that
"the Park itself ... is of 'recognized quality' as a work of 'fine
art.' 208
IV. BUT IS IT ART?
Frederick Law Olmsted, who, more than 100 years after his
death, remains America's best known landscape designer, pro-
duced works that reflected "[t]wo aspects of [his] work and thought
in particular-his efforts to establish landscape architecture as
an 'Art of Design' and his dedication to the social purposes of his
206 Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
2 71 Id. See Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and
Context, 19 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 27 (2001).
This distinction between work and framework means that there
is a difference between removing a work from its context and
dismembering an integrated artwork into constituent pieces..
.Recognizing that we tend to draw such a line between work
and context, some artists have argued that the framework is
part of the work and therefore the "work" must be understood
expansively.
Id. See also Garson, supra note 42, at 234 ("Regardless of the degree of intimacy
between object and space, as one scholar has noted, '[site-specific] works
elaborate the landscape: the landscape reveals the works. They ... provide a
focused experience of place.'") (citation omitted).
20 Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 101 (internal citation omitted). See MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(f) (West 2004) (directing the court, faced with deciding
whether a work is of recognized quality, to "rely on the opinions of artist[s], art
dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, restorers and con-
servators of fine art and other persons involved with the creation or marketing
of fine art."). VARA gives the artist a right "to prevent any destruction of a work
of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of
that work is a violation of that right." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2000). VARA,
however, does not tell the court how to make the determination of recognized
stature. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999).
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work"; these two "were inextricably interwoven, mutually reinforc-
ing, and generally well balanced."2 9 Today, "we can hope ... that
an enlightened public will recognize that the landscape-shaping,
earth-tending profession is the best promise to restore the health
and beauty of this exhausted earth."210
Landscape design, when practiced with the imagination and
intelligence of Kiley, results in "an 'ideal state' quite independent
of 'real estate,'" and "a 'poetic' property... rather than a material
one."21' Such design, done publicly, creates an accessible place that
is quite real and beautiful, and that also evokes emotions and
spirits like those evoked by other art forms. 2 The design can be at
once poetic and real. It is dynamic, organic, and artistic. It is a
resource both material and spiritual.2 13
209 WALKER & SIMO, supra note 36, at 5. See Patricia Leigh Brown, A Park Offers
Nature, Not Just Hoops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2000, at F1 ("'In a sense, we've
come full circle back to Olmsted .... We're rediscovering the idea of wild,
romantic landscapes in the city as a way of balancing social, physical and
economic issues."); David W. Dunlap, A Chip Off the Old Park, N.Y. TIMES, Sep.
30, 2004, at B1 (quoting Olmsted).210 Kay, supra note 31. See Patricia Leigh Brown, He Measures Oakland's Beat,
and Parks Bloom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at Al ("Landscape architects are
serving an increasingly visible role in reshaping cities .... Mr. Hood is among
those rejuvenating the forgotten urban edges of cities-the vacant, often
environmentally devastated stretches of land once consigned to industry and
often in low income neighborhoods.").21 1 LANDSCAPE AND POWER 15 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1994).
212 See Darian-Smith, supra note 29, at 402-03 ("The garden 'is a model for
everything that reality is not.' This ambiguity, this fluidity of meaning,
challenges and mediates a tangible and metaphorical manifestation of what is
accepted as the garden landscape. It opens up its symbolism to various inter-
pretations, possibilities, and manipulations.") (citation omitted).
The author said "the garden may function . . . as a utopian site of
innocence, pleasure, and leisure."Id. at 402. See also THE MEANING OF GARDENS:
IDEA, PLACE, AND ACTION 8 (Mark Francis & Randolph T. Hester, Jr. eds., 1990)
('The garden exists not only as an idea or a place or an action but as a complex
ecology of spatial reality, cognitive process, and real work.").213 See Serena M. Williams, Sustaining Urban Green Spaces: Can Public Parks
Be Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine?, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 23, 25 (2002).
Urban parks should be treated as a scarce natural resource.
Once depleted, this resource is practically irreplaceable and is
irretrievably removed from use by the public. Under the public
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In Unionville-Chadds Ford School District v. Chester County
Board of Assessment Appeals,2 14 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had to decide whether Longwood Gardens, "a very large and world-
renowned public garden," was entitled to a tax exemption as a
public charity.21 The court said Longwood featured
an expansive arboretum where trees and shrubs are
cultivated, immaculate flower gardens, collections
of rare plants, a huge conservatory and greenhouse
complex, architectural displays, a water garden, foun-
tains, an open air theater for the performing arts,
managed meadow and forest lands, wetlands, wildlife
habitats, walking trails, picnic areas, and a variety
of educational and research facilities.216
The school district conceded that "Longwood advances a charitable
purpose... including public use of the park-like grounds as well
as educational and research activities."2 17
However, the school district argued that under Pennsylvania
law, the only "legitimate subjects of charity" were "the poor, the
infirm, and the needy."21' The court responded that
a facility as large and multi-faceted as Longwood is
a unique resource that virtually no individual could
trust doctrine, [governments] serving as public trustees ...
would acquire a duty of loyalty to the trust beneficiaries (the
public) and a duty of care over the trust assets (the park).
Id. (citing Slocum v. Borough of Belmar 569 A.2d 312, 317 (N.J. Super. L. Div.
1989). New York City recently spent $37 million to rehabilitate parks in lower
Manhattan. See David W. Dunlap, Greening Ye Olde Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2004, at E25.
214 714 A.2d 397 (Pa. 1998).
2151Id. at 398. See Survey of Selected Court Decisions, Unionville-Chadds Ford
School District v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals: The
Commonwealth Court Undertakes an Expansive, Yet Justified, Review of the
Pennsylvania Tax Exemption Law, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 937 (1999).21 Unionville-Chadds, 714 A.2d at 398.
217Id. at 399.
21 1d. at 400.
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afford to maintain on his or her own. It is in this
regard comparable to a public library, museum, or art
gallery. Such institutions have qualified as purely
public charities notwithstanding the fact that many,
indeed probably most, of their visitors are not inca-
pacitated or poor.219
Pennsylvania had "long provided support for public parks and
recreation areas," and "Longwood's public park and cultural faci-
lities fall clearly within the scope of burdens that are routinely
shouldered by government."22 °
The benefits of such landscape design are public benefits. The
public deserves "a built environment of beautiful, inviting places
where they feel part of the larger community."22 ' The public should
expect "places that are at once designed landscapes and pieces of
art."222 The attraction of such places is real, if not always rationally
explicable.223
219 Id. (internal citations omitted).
220Id. at 401.
221 William Callaway, Strong Building Designs Are Often Diluted By a Lack Of
Sensitivity To Setting: Landscape Architecture Must Be Given Its Due,
ARCHITECTURAL REC., Oct. 1999, at 24. See also Barbara Bender, Introduction:
Landscape-Meaning and Action, in LANDSCAPE: POLITICS AND PERSPECTIVES 1,
3 (Barbara Bender ed., 1993) ("The landscape is never inert, people engage with
it, re-work it, appropriate and contest it. It is part of the way in which identities
are created and disputed, whether as individual, group, or nation-state.").
222 Paul Bennett, The Other Side of the Fence: What Drives Landscape
Architecture Now, ARCHITECTURAL REC., Jan. 2000, at 58. See also SPIRN,
LANGUAGE OF LANDSCAPE, supra note 34, at 17-18 ("Humans are not the sole
authors of landscape.... All living things share the same space, all make
landscape, and all landscapes ... are phenomena of nature and culture....
[B] ut only humans (as far as we yet know) reflect, worship, make art, and design
landscapes ....").
2 2
1 See Verlyn Klinkenborg, Without Walls, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 16, 2004, at
15 ("When it comes to man-made landscapes, metaphors are largely a guide to
that deep strand of emotion that runs through our experience of place. But
whether we paint or build our landscapes, they end up evoking a response that
runs right to the core of our beings."). See also Merryman, Cultural Property,
supra note 199, at 340-41 ("We cannot resolve cultural policy questions on
rational grounds alone.... [C]ultural objects have a variety of expressive effects
that can be described, but not fully captured, in logical terms.").
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For example, Central Park, which reflects both the public
benefit and artistic merit that attach to top-level landscape design,
"was created as... a place to uplift the spirit and improve the
senses. The park was seen as a tangible manifestation of and way
to advance democracy: the government was physically supporting
culture and the arts, and providing a place for all citizens of all
classes."224 Works such as Central Park "have a unique power to
transform the way we interact with our environment, by providing
us with new ways of redescribing and reinterpreting our exis-
tence."225 But the integrity of these works "need to be preserved if
they are to continue to serve this function for us and for our
descendants; if we destroy or alter them, future generations will
not be able to share this experience."226
As a culture, we project our views and expectations into the
environment that we design and build around us. 227 Landscape
design can produce an aesthetic experience, evoking individual
224 Cyane Gresham, Note, Improving Public Trust Protections of Municipal
Parkland in New York, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 259, 294-95 (2002) (citations
omitted).
225 Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 36-37 (1997) (citations omitted). See Clyde Haberman, A Spot to Rest,
And to Honor Love and Loss, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at B1 (describing a
program where citizens can adopt a Central Park bench and have a message
inscribed on a plaque installed on the back of the bench).
In this fashion, New Yorkers have expressed their undying love
for one another and for the park. They have celebrated
birthdays and wedding anniversaries. They have mourned the
passing of a parent or, worse, a child. They have spoken in
poetry and in prose. They have wept in pain and whooped in
delight.
Id.2261Id. See Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 671 F. Supp. 1105,
1107 (W.D. Va. 1987) (upholding the University of Virginia's policy against
erecting structures on the lawn and stating that "the University has a valid
interest in preserving the 'esthetic integrity' of its historic grounds") (internal
citation omitted). The University was permitted to "regulate the symbolic speech
of its students to preserve and protect the Lawn area as an architectural
landmark." Id. at 1108.
227 See Gordon Bermant, Courting the Virtual: Federal Courts in an Age of
Complete Inter-connectedness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 527, 530 (1999).
318
20051 THE LANDSCAPE ART OF DANIEL URBAN KILEY
responses across the emotional spectrum.228 The design can evoke
the spiritual and the romantic, can stimulate and relax, and can
be awe inspiring and perceptually pleasing.229 And public design is
open to all-it is a resource that promotes the general welfare.
The aesthetic of landscape design is no accident. Designers
like Kiley see in artistic and functional terms. They make the
landscape visible and accessible. 2 0 "They have both the practical
experience and the spiritual sensitivity to look over a region and
select the natural configuration of open space around which the
built world could arrange itself."23'
22 See Bobrowski, supra note 27, at 722 ("Much recent work concludes that there
is an undeniable 'aesthetic experience' connected to the landscape. The nature
of this aesthetic experience 'refers to the subjective thoughts, feelings, and
emotions expressed by an individual during the course of an experience.'")
(citations omitted).229 See Klinkenborg, supra note 223, at 15.
It's a human instinct to try to create perceptual order wherever
we look, no matter how much disorder surrounds us.... That's
why walking into a setting shaped by a landscape architect has
such a powerful effect. All the disarray has been filtered out for
us. We suddenly glimpse what the world would look like if it
were the work of a single hand, a single eye, a world created to
please our emotions of place.
Id.230 See Daralice D. Boles, New American Landscape, Introduction, PROGRESSIVE
ARCHITECTURE, July 1989, at 51, 54 ("It is the word 'art,' even more than garden,
that signifies the sea change in landscape architecture. 'I'm seen as a radical
because I think landscape can be practiced as an art'.... 'My goal is to make the
landscape visual.'"). See Robin Finn, A Landscaper's Presence in 'Reflecting
Absence' N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2004, at B2. Peter Walker, the landscape designer
working on the 9/11 memorial in New York City
is secure that he, a landscape doctor with a proclivity for
transforming negative urban spaces into positive ones, is the
man to refine Mr. Arad's design. "To cut two giant holes in the
ground, and do it in a way that will get people to read it the
most dramatic way, is the discipline behind the plan .... [Wlhat
we're trying to do is make emptiness visible."
Id.
231 Suzannah Lessard, Sprawl Has Turned the World Inside Out: Landscape
Architects May Be the Ones To Civilize It, ARCHITECTURAL REC., Aug. 2000, at
58.
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There is also an expressive component to art, no matter what
medium, including the landscape, is used. In Bery v. City of New
York,232 the Second Circuit confronted a challenge to the city's
vendor law, which barred "visual artists from exhibiting, selling or
offering their work for sale in public places in New York City
without first obtaining a general vendors license."233 The city
considered the plaintiffs' work "as mere 'merchandise' lacking in
communicative concepts or ideas," a position that the court
characterized as "an unduly restricted view of the First Amend-
ment and of visual art itself."234 The court stated that visual art
is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts
and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or
other writing .... Indeed, written language is far
more constricting because of its many variants ....
The ideas and concepts embodied in visual art have
the power to transcend these language limitations
and reach beyond a particular language group to both
the educated and the illiterate. As the Supreme
Court has reminded us, visual images are "a primi-
tive but effective way of communicating ideas.., a
short cut from mind to mind."235
232 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
23 3 See Christina A. Mathes, Note, Bery v. New York: Do Artists Have a First
Amendment Right to Sell and Display Art in Public Places?, 5 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 103 (1998).2
'Bery, 97 F.3d at 695.
2351Id. (citations omitted). See Krasilovsky, supra note 32, at 542-43.
[AIrt, unlike books... may be permanently displayed outdoors,
and often has a more significant communicative impact than
speech because it appeals to the human consciousness on many
different levels other than verbal or linguistic ones. Art is a
more powerful communicative medium because it does not
depend on language, but on visual symbols, to convey meaning;
the content may be understood across social and cultural
boundaries without translation.
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The court concluded that the "public display and sale of artwork is
a form of communication between the artist and the public not
possible in the enclosed, separated spaces of galleries and muse-
umS."
2 3 6
The extent of this analysis was tested in Mastrovincenzo v.
City of New York.2 37 The plaintiffs were "both trained freelance
artists who employ[ed] what they label[ed] a 'graffiti' style of
painting" to "paint articles of clothing, especially hats, using paint
pens and spray cans, and sell them from sidewalk displays."238 The
issue was whether these items were "expressive merchandise."
23 9
The court said that there are expressive means that "have a
way to speak to us without words, and enable us to perceive what
the artist may have had in mind simply by their quality to
evoke."240 The court, based on this view, said
what is art may be defined and found in this two-way
interchange, even in silence-a correspondence at
the meeting point of recognition and understanding
between an artist stirred enough by creative fluids to
236Bery, 97 F.3d at 698. But see Krasilovsky, supra note 32, at 538.
[Ilt may be unwise for courts to base the determination of
whether or not something is art upon the reaction of the viewer;
some viewers may not wish to ponder an artistic object, or may
not see it as art at all. It may therefore be incumbent upon
courts to look at the origin of the aesthetic object and seek the
presence of a creative impulse in its genesis, or to create a
rebuttable presumption that an aesthetic object is art.
Id. (citation omitted).
237 313 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).238 Id. at 283-84. See Michelle Bougdanos, Comment, The Visual Artists Rights
Act and Its Application to Graffiti Murals: Whose Wall Is It Anyway?, 18 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 549 (2002).
239Mastrovincenzo, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 285.24
°Id. See SPIRN, LANGUAGE OF LANDSCAPE, supra note 34, at 15 ("Landscape has
all the features of language. It contains the equivalent of words and parts of
speech-patterns of shape, structure, material, formation, and function. ...
Landscape is pragmatic, poetic, rhetorical, polemical. Landscape is scene of life,
cultivated construction, carrier of meaning. It is language.").
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give expression to a thought through a chosen me-
dium, and the audience that receives the idea so
conveyed.241
The court noted that "[ciivilization has traveled too far down the
road in the evolution of art as embracing the whole spectrum of
human imagination for the law to countenance a classification of
an artist's design as art only when imparted in conventional
shapes and forms sufficiently familiar or acceptable to a govern-
ment licensor."242
If we accept "the notion that 'art is expression,' something to
'express feeling and transmit understanding' no matter the
medium," then landscape design is art-visual art.243 It is also
public art, which "does not merely present a collection of formal
aesthetic attributes; it alters its environment, affects its viewer,
and forges moral meaning."
24
Maya Lin, designer of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, has
said "'I don't design pure objects... I work with the landscape, and
241Mastrovincenzo, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 285-86.
242Id. at 289. See Liemer, supra note 39, at 41 ("Just as creative work, i.e. art,
mirrors life, so does the law pertaining to art. The law in a given society reveals
the value of creativity in that society. As these values fluctuate over time,
changes in the law reveal the nature of those fluctuations.").243 Joffrain, supra note 38, at 785.
24 4 Zlatarski, supra note 41, at 201 (citation omitted). The landscape design for
the 9/11 Memorial in New York City "contributes more than prettiness: it confers
meaning. It signifies the abundance that sometimes follows a rupture in the
natural order of things." Herbert Muschamp, Strong Depth of Emotion and No
Frills in 2 Footprints, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at B1. In a New York Times
editorial, the memorial's design was described as "a vision of how all the
elements that might come into play can be combined to greatest effect.... The
real memorial is a single coherent work of art ... and it must be protected as
such." Editorial, supra note 49, at A18.
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I hope that the object and the land are equal players."' 245 Such
landscape design realizes
a particular society's, even a particular person's,
attitudes toward space and nature. The deliberately
constructed milieu invokes selected forms and mate-
rials to express . . .some human response to and
recognition of an environment; this environment will
be physical, topographical, but it will also include
less tangible, spiritual values.24
One author has even claimed that "landscape design may well be
recognized as the most comprehensive of the arts." 7 Landscape
design has the "creative, imprecise nature of artistic expression."
248
24 5Garson, supra note 42, at 233-34 (citation omitted). See also Louis Menand,
The Reluctant Memorialist, THE NEW YORKER, July 8, 2002, at 55, 56.
Lin's work is self-consciously beautiful, because she is obsessed
with harmony-how we fit into the world and how the world
shapes us .... Her impulse is not to impose form; it is to evoke
from out of what is given-the landscape, the building, the light,
the natural materials at hand. This impulse expresses itself in
work that is simple, graceful, and, in its detachment, a little
Zen.
Id.
246 JOHN DIXON HUNT, GARDENS AND THE PICTURESQUE: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
OF LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE 9 (1992).
247 GEOFFREY ALAN JELLICOE & SUSAN JELLICOE, THE LANDSCAPE OF MAN:
SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT DAY 7 (1975)
("[M] an's destiny being to rise above the animal state, he creates around him an
environment that is a projection into nature of his abstract ideas .... [This] is
promoting a landscape art on a scale never conceived of in history."). See also
Klinkenborg, supra note 223, at 16 ("'Landscape architects and gardeners, and
we who enjoy their creations without special instruction or persuasion, are
responding to a deep genetic memory of mankind's optimal environment.' The
taste with which we recreate that environment may vary, but the impulse to do
so never does." (citation omitted)).
248 Daniel Mach, Note, The Bold and the Beautiful: Art, Public Spaces, and the
First Amendment, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,388 (1997). See also Marci A. Hamilton,
Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 77 (1996) ("Art can carry ideas and information,
but it also goes beyond logical, rational, and discursive communication. It
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Kiley captured this creativity and imprecision in his designs and
in these words:
[I]t is the movement, textures, colours, smells and
sounds of the details that engage people on a day-to-
day basis and bring the design to life.... And this
communication, or perception and reaction to the
built environment, is what we are trying to shape. As
a landscape design matures, its qualities evolve,
leading to a 'mature' state that is quite different from
the same site at completion of installation (a phenom-
enon to which most of the other design arts are not
subject) .249
Landscape design is dynamic. It is intended to change over time.
And, at its most successful, it is invisible; the observer sees nature,
not realizing that it is designed. °
provides a risk-free opportunity to live in other worlds, enlarging individual
perspective and strengthening individual judgment.").
249 KILEY & AMIDON, supra note 7, at 136. See also SPIRN, LANGUAGE OF
LANDSCAPE, supra note 34, at 202.
Landscape architects structure future form not only by direct
shaping of material, form, and space, but also, indirectly,
through anticipating how process will continue to mold land-
scape, and by devising a plan for management of change over
time. The great challenge of landscape expression is the
complexity of the medium and the fact of its abiding change.
Id.
250 See SPIRN, LANGUAGE OF LANDSCAPE, supra note 34, at 54.
Olmsted was so skilled at concealing his artifice that the
projects he so brilliantly constructed as well as the profession he
had worked so hard to establish-landscape architecture-
became largely invisible.... [Miany landmarks of landscape
architecture are assumed to be either works of nature or
felicitous, serendipitous products of culture. Their very success
prevents appreciation of their triumphs as artful answers to
knotty problems of conflicting environmental values or compet-
ing purposes.
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CONCLUSION
Kiley, as a landscape designer, was an artist.2 1 As an artist,
his work provided benefit and a public good to all.252 Thus, the
integrity of this work should be protected.2 3 The benefit of seeing
the work as it-was designed to be seen is to the advantage of all.
On a personal level, Kiley, the artist, had vested in the work the
force and spirit of his own personality, a force and spirit that the
251 See THE ICONOGRAPHY OF LANDSCAPE: ESSAYS ON THE SYMBOLIC
REPRESENTATION, DESIGN, AND USE OF PAST ENVIRONMENTS 1 (Denis Cosgrove
& Stephen Daniels eds. 1988).
A landscape is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing,
structuring or symbolizing surroundings.... A landscape park
is more palpable but no more real, nor less imaginary, than a
landscape painting or poem. Indeed the meanings of verbal,
visual and built landscapes have a complex interwoven history.
Id.
252 See BETSKY, supra note 34, at 22-23 ("A new generation of landscape
architects is redefining and restoring the land to a state where its common
enjoyment draws us together in public spaces and makes us conscious of where
we are.... [L]andscape architects reclaim the primacy of the land as a shaper
of communal experience."). See also Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 38, at 106.
One source of this public interest is that great works of art often
become important elements in a community's culture: other
works of art are created in response to them, and they become
common reference points or icons that are widely shared in
social communication. The loss or alteration of such works
would therefore be costly to the community at large, depriving
that community, as it were, of a widely used part of its
previously shared vocabulary.
Id. (citation omitted).
253 See Halpern, supra note 192, at 84-85.
Moral rights may assist in promoting the social interest in the
preservation of works that ... embody, stimulate, and provide
us with new ways of redescribing and reimagining human
experience. Moreover, a commitment to the goal of human
flourishing suggests that according respect to the person of the
artist, as well as to works of art generally, may be desirable ends
in and of themselves.
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work communicates to observers. 4 Interfering with the integrity
of the art is interfering with the integrity of the artist.255 This is
disrespect which the law should not countenance.
254See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Rights: A Study in the Law of
Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554,557 (1940) ("When an artist
creates.. . he does more than bring into the world a unique object having only
exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part of his personality and
subjects it to the ravages of public use."). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
"Author-Stories:" Narrative's Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright's
Joint Authorship Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001).
At base, moral rights laws are concerned primarily with
safeguarding an artist's dignity as an individual and as an
author. The interest served by moral rights law is funda-
mentally a spiritual one which transcends the author's concern
for property or even reputation.... [Blecause an author's works
"continue to embody the author's personality, acts done to them
that impair their ability accurately to reflect the author's
personality should be actionable."
Id. (citations omitted).
215 See Liemer, supra note 39, at 50-51.
The right of integrity protects the artist . . . . Prohibiting
changes without permission shows respect for the art work, its
creator, and the process by which she created. This right avoids
value judgments as to the quality of the art and the seriousness
of the artist's undertaking. The society that recognizes this right
recognizes the value of all creative efforts and uses it to
encourage more.
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